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The Florida Securities Act of 1978
SIDNEY T. BERNSTEIN* AND SETH P. JOSEPH**
The authors provide a critical analysis of the new Florida
blue sky law. The policies underlying the Florida Securities Act
are identified to aid in the construction of an often vague statute.
Specific provisions are considered in light of these policies and
compared with the prior law in the areas of exempt transactions,
exempt securities and professionals in the securities industry.
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I. PRIOR LAW
A. The Historical Development of Florida's Blue Sky Law
The first blue sky law' was enacted largely as the result of an
ambitious publicity campaign conducted by Kansas Bank Commis-
sioner J.N. Dolley.1 Although much of the information advanced by
Dolley in support of his drive for merit regulation' was subsequently
determined to be false,' the Kansas blue sky law became a model
for legislators in other states who desired to increase their followings
by propounding concepts which held a Populist appeal.' Florida was
1. "Blue Sky Laws" are comprehensive securities laws enacted by state legislatures. For
a discussion of the origin of the term "blue sky laws" and their intent, see Mulvey, Blue Sky
Law, in 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37, 37-39 (1916). The first legislative scheme to be characterized as
a blue sky law was enacted by Kansas in 1911. See 1911 Kans. Sess. Laws ch. 133. Limited
regulation of offerings of securities, however, had existed prior to the enactment of the Kansas
blue sky law. See IIC H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-BLUE SKY
REGULATION pt. 1, § 1.01, at 1-1 to -2 (1977),
2. See J. MOYSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 10-11 (1971).
3. "Merit regulation" can be defined as a varying degree of discretion on the part of state
officials to approve or disapprove the sale of securities based upon their substantive merit.
See H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, supra note 1, pt. 2, § 7.01, at 7-2.
4. See J. MOSKY, supra note 2, at 11 & n.33 (citing L. Loss & E. CowE'r, BLUE SKY
LAW 8 (1958)); Mulvey, supra note 1, at 39-40.
5. See J. MOFSKY, supra note 2, at 11. The Populists were late 19th century and turn-of-
the-century politicians who sought support from agrarian constituents by denouncing indus-
tralists and other organizers of capital as "robber barons." The Populists gained support for
the blue sky laws by arguing that economic downturns had needlessly been caused by a failure
to regulate capital markets. Id. at 10.
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among the first states to follow suit and adopted a blue sky. law
patterned after the Kansas act in 1913. V
The Florida blue sky law of 1913 imposed several kinds of regu-
lation upon persons selling or offering to sell securities.' Companies
which issued securities were required to file disclosure statements
prior to making sales or offers to sell.' The Comptroller and the
6. See Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1974);
Robinton & Sowards, Florida's Blue Sky Law: The Lawyer's Approach, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 525,
526 (1952). Within two years of the enactment of the first blue sky law by the Kansas
Legislature, 23 states had followed suit. H. SowARns & N. HIRSCH, supra note 1, pt. 1, § 1.01
n.12.
7. 1913 Fla. Laws ch. 6422. The scope of blue sky regulation was considerably narrower
under this early act than it is today due to the then prevalent understanding of the operant
concepts. The persons whom the Act subjected to the regulatory authority of the Comptroller
and the Attorney General were domestic and foreign "Investment Companies" and agents of
investment companies. A domestic investment company was defined as:
[E]very Corporation, other than municipal Corporations, State and National
Banks, Trust Companies, Public Utility Corporations, Corporations under the
jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission of the State of Florida, and Corporations
not organized for profit, which are now organized or which may be organized in
this State, which shall offer for sale within the State of Florida . . . [any secu-
rity] . . . shall be known for the purposes of this Act as a Domestic Investment
Company.
1913 Fla. Laws ch. 6422, § 1. "Foreign Investment Companies" were all corporations organ-
ized in any jurisdiction other than Florida. Id. According to these definitions, securities
regulation reached no further than to "securities" issued by the class of corporations known
as "Investment Companies."
Perhaps due to the naivet6 of an earlier era, the term "security" was not described by a
comprehensive series of nouns and adjectives. Language, however, which may be taken as a
generic description of "securities" was contained in § 1, which was meant to define invest-
ment companies. Section 1 stated that the regulatory provisions of the Act were triggered
when an investment company sold "stocks, bonds, debentures, certificates, policies or other
securities of any kind or character." Id.
8. Pursuant to § 2, investment companies were required to file at the Office of the
Comptroller:
A Statement showing in full detail the plan upon which it proposes to transact
business: a copy of all contracts, bonds, stock or other instruments which it
proposes to make with or sell to its contractors; a statement which shall show the
name and location of the Investment Company; an itemized account of its actual
financial standing, showing the amount, character and location of its property
and its liabilities; and such other information touching its affairs as said Comp-
troller may require. It shall also file with the Comptroller a copy of its Articles of
Incorporation, constitution and by-laws and all other papers pertaining to its
organization, all of which above papers and documents shall be verified by the
oath of the President of such Corporation, or by some duly authorized officer of
same.
Id. § 2. These documents were subject to the scrutiny of the Comptroller and the Attorney
General. Id. § 4. Since § 4 authorized the administrators to make independent investigations
of the financial condition of an issue at the issuer's expense, investment companies had a
strong incentive to provide thorough disclosure. Moreover, this authority provided the admin-
istrators with a method of discouraging offerings without having to resort to the fair, just and
equitable merit standards of § 4.
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Attorney General were vested with authority to prohibit the sale of
securities if they found that an offering was unfair, unjust or in-
equitable.' Agents of an issuer who sold an issuer's securities were
subject to the regulatory authority of the Comptroller and Attorney
General.10 The Act also contained a limited antifraud provision."
Not all corporations who issued securities were required to file statements with the
administrators. Under the definition of investment company provided in the Act, exempted
from registration were domestic municipal corporations, state and national banks, trust com-
panies, public utility corporations, regulated railroad companies and not for profit corpora-
tions. Id. § 1. In 1915, policies sold by licensed insurance companies were also exempted from
the Act. See 1915 Fla. Laws ch. 6862, § 1. Furthermore, investment companies were exempt
from the filing requirement when they sold stock solely in the county of their principal place
of business. Mortgage Holding Co. v. Summy, 97 Fla. 403, 121 So. 473 (1929). All foreign
corporations, however, were defined as foreign investment companies and were subjected to
the regulatory provisions. 1913 Fla. Laws ch. 6422, § 1.
9. Section 4 of the Act provided that the administrators were authorized to examine the
documents submitted pursuant to § 2 and to issue a statement that an investment company
had complied with the provisions of the Act if: "[The administrator] finds that such Invest-
ment Company is solvent, and that its articles of incorporation and association, its constitu-
tion and bylaws, its proposed plan of business and contracts, contain a fair, just and equitable
plan for the transaction of business." 1913 Fla. Laws ch. 6422, § 4. (emphasis added). There
were many grounds for and serious consequences arising from administrative disapproval of
an offering:
[I]f said Comptroller and Attorney General find that such Articles of Incorpora-
tion or association, charter, constitution and by-laws, plan of business or proposed
contract contain any provision that is unfair, unjust or inequitable or oppressive
to any class of contractor, or if they decide from their examination of its affairs
that said Investment Company is not solvent and does not intend in good faith
to do a fair and honest business, then they shall notify said Investment Company
in writing of their finding and it shall be unlawful for such company to sell or offer
for sale any of its securities in this State until it shall so change its constitution
and by-laws, articles of incorporation or association, its proposed plan of business
and contract, and its general financial condition in such manner as to satisfy the
Comptroller and Attorney General ....
Id. The Act failed to provide criteria for the constituent elements of fair, just and equitable
transactions. For an illustration of the host of problems created by this omission, see text
accompanying notes 24-33 infra.
The merit standard of § 4 was supplemented by § 8, which provided:
Whenever it shall appear to the Comptroller and Attorney General that the
assets of an Investment Company doing business in the State are impaired to the
extent that such assets do not equal its liabilities or that it is conducting its
business in an unsafe, inequitable, or unauthorized manner, or jeopardizing the
interests of its stockholders and investors in stocks, bonds, or other securities by
it offered for sale, or whenever any Investment Company shall fail to or refuse to
file any papers, statements or documents required by this Act, without giving
satisfactory reasons therefor, said Comptroller and Attorney General shall at once
revoke the license of said Investment Company to do any further business in the
State of Florida.
Id. § 8. Thus, the administrators were empowered both to insist upon a certain capital
structure at the formation of a firm and also to monitor alterations in the firm's capital
structure even in the aftermarket.
10. Pursuant to § 6 of the Act, investment companies were authorized to appoint agents
[Vol. 33:1223
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In 1931, the Florida Legislature repealed the earlier blue sky
law and replaced it with the Florida Sale of Securities Law. This
was done in order to promote uniformity among the blue sky laws
of the several states." Florida retained its Sale of Securities Law
until 1976. The regulatory scheme established by the Sale of Securi-
ties Law was far more complete and, therefore, had more of a de-
structive impact upon capital markets than did the Act of 1913.' 3
B. The Perils of Merit Regulation
Ultimately, the Sale of Securities Law contained both a fair,
just and equitable standard and proscriptions against offerings
which either were based upon "unsound business principles" or
tended to work frauds upon the investors." The Florida Securities
to sell securities subject to certain conditions. Each agent was required to register with the
Comptroller as an agent of the issuer. Id. § 6. The Comptroller and the Attorney General, at
their discretion, were authorized to require the agents to provide bonds in amounts specified
by the administrator payable to the Governor. Id. If the offering were unfair or unjust, the
person injured thereby was entitled to bring suit on those bonds. Id.
11. Knowingly making any false statement as to the financial condition of an investment
company was deemed a felony. Id. § 9.
12. See 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899. The general purpose of the Florida Sale of Securities
Law was to make the Florida blue sky law uniform with securities regulations imposed by
other states. Id. § 21. Although the Sale of Securities Law imposed a much greater regulatory
burden upon issuers and the investing public, the reform was made salable by the argument
that the costs of blue skying securities would be reduced if all of the states adopted the
uniform act. In the end, only seven states, including Florida, adopted the uniform act. H.
SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, supra note 1, pt. 1, at § 1.03 n.5. The expected benefits never material-
ized and, in 1944, the Uniform Sale of Securities Act was stricken from the list of approved
uniform acts. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONEIS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK
AND PROCEEDINGS 81 (1944), cited in Robinton & Sowards, supra note 6, at 527 n.7.
13. See J. MoFSKY, supra note 2, at 16-17; Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit
Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 367, 367-70 (1977).
14. In the 1931 enactment, the merit standards which had prevailed under the Act of
1913 were retained. Moreover, the subject matter of the regulations was increased due to the
enlarged concepts of "issuers" and "securities." To bring these transactions under regulatory
scrutiny, the Sale of Securities Law provided the registration of new issues by either notifica-
tion or qualification. 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 7 & 8. All issuers who had not been in
continuous operation for at least three years or who had not shown a specified fixed level of
earnings, were required to register new issues by qualification. Id. § 7, discussed in Robinton
& Sowards, supra note 6, at 535-37. As originally enacted, the Florida Sale of Securities Law
authorized the Florida Securities Commission to record the registration of securities which
were registered by qualification if the regulators found that "the sale of the security .. .
would not be fraudulent and would not work or tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser,
and that the enterprise or business of the issuer is not based upon unsound business princi-
ples." 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 8(i). Thus, as originally -enacted, the "fair, just and
equitable" standard was not perpetuated. But see Jennings, The Role of the States in Corpo-
rate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 225-26 (1958). After
the initial passion for uniformity had cooled, the Florida Legislature amended the Sale of
Securities Law specifically to impose the fair, just and equitable standard. 1959 Fla. Laws
ch. 59-172, § 1.
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Commission and its successor, the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance, perceived these standards as a mandate to promulgate regu-
lations controlling: (1) underwriting commissions and offering ex-
penses; 1 (2) cheap stock; 1 (3) stock options; 7 (4) offering price; 8 (5)
voting rights;'9 (6) interest and dividend coverage; 0 and (7) promot-
ers' equity investment." The combined effect of these substantive
controls was to restrict entry by small firms and by firms in the
promotional stage into public capital markets as illustrated by ref-
erence to the following hypothetical situation:
Thomas Edison organized a sole proprietorship to facilitate the
invention and manufacture of the incandescent bulb. After a disas-
ter destroyed all but $150,000 of his equipment and machinery,
Edison estimated that he would need to raise $2 million in order to
complete the research and development of the product. Edison soon
found that no lending institution would finance his project due to
the restrictions on interest rates imposed by usury laws.2" A limited
offering of securities would be inappropriate because the investors
would demand too much control over the company.23 Edison there-
15. The Sale of Securities Law authorized the Florida Securities Commission to "fix the
maximum amount of commission or other form of remuneration to be paid in cash or other-
wise, not to exceed 20%, directly or indirectly, for or in connection with the sale or offering
for sale of. . . securities in this State." 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 8(i).
16. See Rule 3E-20.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,674.
17. See Rule 3E-20.06-.07, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,176-77.
18. See 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 8(i), discussed in Robinton & Sowards, The Florida
Securities Act: A Re-examination, 12 U. MtAMI L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1957).
19. See Rule 3E-20.05, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,675.
20. See Rule 3E-20.09, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,679.
21. See Rule 3E-20.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,674.
22. Prior to July 1, 1979, the maximum lawful rate of interest for loans to both individu-
als and corporations was 15%. FiA. STAT. § 687.03 (1977).
23. See Mofsky, Adverse Consequences of Blue Sky Regulation of Public Offering
Expenses, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1010, 1022. Private placements made pursuant to the Sale of
Securities Law were offers or sales to a maximum number of persons within a limited period
of time with the proceeds put in escrow for a promotional firm. See FLA. STAT. §§ 517.06(10)-
(11) (1977) (repealed 1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 147-157 infra.
A major reason for the great loss of control involved in a private placement can be
explained as follows: purchasers of privately placed stock are generally sophisticated inves-
tors. See Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 571, 574 (1977). These
sophisticated investors will extract offsetting benefits from issuers to compensate for each
additional restriction which securities regulation imposes upon the liquidity of their invest-
ments. Both Florida and federal securities law place extremely burdensome restrictions upon
the resale of securities purchased in a private placement. Thus, investors act to protect
themselves by retaining a greater modicum of control.
Under federal law the would-be seller must run the gauntlet of rule 144. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.144 (1978). Until recently, even more restrictive conditions had to be met under Florida
law. The only readily available exemption in most instances was the isolated sale exemption.
See FLA. STAT. § 517.06(3) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.061(3) (Supp. 1978)), discussed
[Vol. 33:1223
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fore resolved to issue the securities of Edison, Inc. in a public offer-
ing.
1. OFFERING PRICE
A major problem which Edison would encounter upon submit-
ting the registration statement of Edison, Inc. for review by the
Department of Banking and Finance would be caused by merit
regulation of the offering price of the issuer's securities. Since Edi-
son, Inc. would be required to register by qualification, the Depart-
ment would be authorized by the Sale of Securities Law to deny
recordation of the registration statement if, in their estimation, the
issuer's plan was based upon "unsound business principles." 4 In
past enforcement of this vague requirement, the Department has
uniformly denied recordation when issuers sought to raise in excess
of 400% of the net capital of the firm. 5 Thus, Edison, Inc. would be
limited to a public offering of $600,000.
2. OFFERING EXPENSES
Even if it had been feasible for Edison to complete successfully
the development of the bulb on this allowance, the restrictions on
offering expenses imposed by the blue sky laws might have frus-
trated Edison's plan. The Sale of Securities Law provided that the
total expenses of marketing an offering of securities must be limited
to twenty percent of the total offering price.2" Thus, Edison, Inc.
could not have expended more than $120,000 for: (1) direct and
indirect underwriter's compensation; (2) underwriter's cheap stock
and options; (3) attorney's and accountant's fees; and (4) printing
in Robinton & Sowards, supra note 6, at 533-34. Sophisticated purchasers aware of the
difficulties of disposing of the stock, value the securities according to the restriction. See
Greenberg, An Estate Planner's View of Investment, Control and Business Combination
Stock, in THE FOURTH ANNUAL INsTrrTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 8-13 to -15 (P. Heckerling ed.
1970).
There are other anticompetitive effects of the restrictions on resale. Larger firms, which
have large amounts of capital, can acquire the assets of a small firm at a bonus price. Because
the only available escape for holders of restricted securities is through a merger with a public
company, large firms can bargain down the price of a small firm based upon the costs imposed
by regulation on other forms of sale. Thus, large firms profit at the expense of small, innova-
tive firms. Most sophisticated investors perceive the benefits of participation in a small firm
as being diminished because they may not resell their holdings, whereas "the large company
that can take over the new company in one bite" can resell. Casey, supra, at 595.
24. 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 8(i); see note 14 supra.
25. See Robinton & Sowards, supra note 18, at 7-8.
26. See 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 8(i).
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and filing costs. The expenses associated with a registered offering
could not realistically be held to that maximum figure.2"
3. THE PROMOTER'S POSITION
As the promoter of Edison, Inc., Edison would be required to
invest at least fifteen percent of the total equity investment to be
raised by this offering." Since the value of the property he trans-
ferred equalled twenty-five percent of the total equity investment,
Edison met this condition. Edison would lose control of the firm,
however, because he would be permitted to receive only twenty-five
percent of the common stock, that is, he would not be allowed to
take cheap stock." With his firm in the promotional stage, Edison
could not issue debt or preferred stock or nonvoting common stock
to the public in order to increase his own equity position. Nor
would the conservative accounting bias of the blue sky laws allow
Edison to include the value of his genius in the relevant calcula-
tions.31
Had he been faced with all of these unnatural obstacles the real
Edison might well have been unable to develop the light bulb.32 The
27. An analysis of six of the smaller distributions made in 1976 by companies
with assets of less than five-million dollars has revealed that the average cost of
registering the offerings was $122,350-an automatic, and in some cases, an insur-
mountable roadblock for companies interested in entering the public market.
Casey, supra note 23, at 575 (footnote omitted) (citing REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON VENTURE
AND EQurrY CAPrrAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS (1977)). See also Campbell, The Plight of Small
Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure From the Capital Market, 1977
DUKE L.J. 1139, 1140; Mofsky, supra note 23, at 1016-1122 passim.
28. See Rule 3E-20.04(a), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,674.
29. See id.
30. See id. 3E-20.05, .09, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,675, 13,679.
31. See Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 635 (1973), cited
in Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of
the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1060 n.144 (1977).
32. Professor Mofsky has noted that the initial offering of the highly successful Xerox
company would not have been permitted in Florida under its merit standards. Roberts,
Securities Bill May Be Legislative Headache, FLA. TREND, 63, 63 (Feb. 1975). The promo-
tion of such new industries is a prerequisite to the economic well-being of our society:
The need is clear enough. From the time of Pericles through Elizabeth I
down to Polaroid, the cutting edge of dynamic socieites has been the innovator,
risking his own savings and those of others having confidence in him, whether
on the waves of the high seas and new horizons or those of high technology and
new services. Almost every new technology that has given a lift to the American
economy has come from a new company, struggling in a garage or venturing out
to obtain needed capital from the public. For example, railroad car manufacturers
did not pioneer the development of automobiles; neither did established auto-
mobile companies develop the first airplanes. The most dramatic recent example
of this phenomenon has been the development of the semi-conductor industry.
Again, the original innovations came from new companies, and not from the
[Vol. 33:1223
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invention and production of the bulb might well have been post-
poned until a wealthy genius conceived the same idea.33
C. The Cry for Reform
Commentators came to criticize aspects of both Florida's blue
sky law and disclosure requirements imposed by securities laws in
general." Many of these critiques were based upon the growing body
of empirical data which supported the efficient capital market hy-
pothesis.35 The efficient capital market hypothesis, which developed
out of the "random walk" theory, postulates, inter alia, that the
financial information provided by required disclosure has no corre-
lation with a firm's future ability to generate earnings. 3 The hy-
pothesis has been supported by empirical demonstrations that in-
vestment advisers, sophisticated in the use of disclosed financial
information, fail to achieve greater increases in the value of the
portfolios they manage than would any investor who randomly
chose a portfolio of similar risk. 7
Because blue sky regulators are dependent upon the same
methods or techniques employed by investment advisers in deter-
mining the success of a particular security to generate earnings, the
confidence in the ability of those regulators to determine which
securities are suitable for public offerings has been shaken by the
growing acceptance of the efficient capital market hypothesis. Even
if the analytical skills of regulators are as acute as those of highly
paid investment advisers, no means exist by which regulators could
more accurately assess the merit of securities than could profes-
sional investment advisers. Furthermore, the regulators' application
manufacturers of vacuum tubes. In the past fifteen years, the industry has passed
through four relatively distinct generations of technology, and each successive
phase has been led by a new entrepreneurial enterprise. Today, innovative young
companies, once established, are not only growing faster, but actually creating
more new jobs and tax revenues than the giants of American industry.
Casey, supra note 23, at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
33. "Unless we keep risk capital flowing into new enterprises our economic progress and
competitiveness in world markets will erode and young people will be denied opportunity."
Casey, supra note 23, at 573.
34. See, e.g., Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (H.
Manne ed. 1969); Kripke, supra note 31; Mofsky, supra note 6, passim; Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. L. 414 (1964).
35. See generally J. LORRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: TEORIES AND EVIDENCE
(1973); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973).
36. See generally Note, supra note 31.
37. See J. LORRIE & HAMILTON, supra note 35.
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of talismanic merit standards, based as they are upon arbitrary and
mechanical formulas, denies investors their choice of securities
without regard to whether investors would be benefited by a viola-
tion of those standards. 8
In 1973, the Florida Law Revision Council, a body formed to
examine perceived weaknesses in Florida's laws and to propose cu-
rative legislation, undertook a comprehensive study of the blue sky
law. The Council solicited and retained as Reporter Professor James
S. Mofsky of the University of Miami School of Law on the basis of
his expertise in the field of securities regulation.3 9 The Reporter's
completed recommendations were adopted by the Council in the
form of a proposed bill in 1974.40 When published, the study won the
support of industry participants, the bar and legal commentators.,,
The study revealed flaws in the existing blue sky law. It became
apparent that the Division of Securities could not adequately serve
as investment adviser to the investing public.42 Furthermore, the
application of the Division's human and economic resources to
merit regulation diverted Division manpower from enforcement of
the antifraud provisions of the blue sky law. It also became apparent
that the blue sky laws imposed competitive disadvantages upon
small firms.1
. To reduce the perceived waste of precious resources, the Coun-
cil proposed to eliminate entirely merit regulation, to emphasize
enforcement of the antifraud provisions and to provide disclosure
standards which paralleled those of the federal securities laws." To
promote a system of disclosure which avoided the economic waste
resulting from unnecessary disclosure, the Council proposed to lib-
eralize some of the exemptions from registration. 5 In general, an
attempt was made to reduce the anticompetitive effects of blue sky
regulation.
The Department of Banking and Finance opposed certain as-
38. See Note, State Securities Regulation: Investor Protection Versus Freedom of the
Market Place, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 947, 961 & n.108 (1977).
39. Roberts, supra note 32, at 63.
40. Id. at 63, 67.
41. Mofsky, supra note 6, discussed in Roberts, supra note 32; Note, supra note 38;
Beasley, Summary of Proposed Revision of Florida Blue Sky Law, Florida Bar Corporation,
Banking & Business Law Newsletter, May 1975, at 2-3.
42. See generally Note, supra note 38.
43. See Mofsky, supra note 6, at 12, 13, 15, 24, 26, 28-32.
44. Id. at 34.
45. Id. The disclosure philosophy which underlies the Federal Securities Laws assumed
from its inception that disclosure, in the form of registration and the distribution of prospec-
tuses, is unnecessary and wasteful when persons purchasing securities from an issuer are in
a position to bargain with the issuer and are thereby able to compel disclosure.
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pects of the Council's proposal. A spokesman for the Division of
Securities vigorously criticized the incorporation'Iin the bill of a
scienter standard as an element of a criminal violation, deeming it
a step backward in the prosecution of alleged violators.46
The Council introduced its proposed bill in the 1975 Session of
the Florida Legislature." The Council, however, withdrew the bill
before it was submitted for a vote as an accommodation to the newly
elected Comptroller, who required an opportunity to study the bill
before making his recommendation to the legislature. When the bill
was reintroduced in the 1976 Session, the Comptroller opposed it.
The bill was passed by the House of Representatives, but the Senate
failed to act upon the bill within the limited time remaining in the
1976 Session. Because the finances for the Council's operation had
been depleted by the end of the 1976 Session and no subsequent
funding of the Council was initiated by the legislature, the bill was
not re-introducpd.' 8
The efforts of the Council might have been wasted if not for the
enactment of sunset legislation in 1976 which mandated the prompt
revision of blue sky laws." The sunset law required that the legisla-
ture subject the blue sky law to the same type of rigorous analysis
made by the Council. Thus, the legislature was committed to a
consideration of: (1) whether a less restrictive method of regulation
which would adequately protect the public existed; (2) the degree
to which the regulation increased the cost of the goods or services
produced by the regulated person; and (3) whether the increased
cost of the goods or services was more harmful to the public than
the harm which could result from the termination of the regulation.
Under the pressure of the sunset law, the Comptroller worked
out a compromise bill with the Council and its supporters. The bill
which was then drafted by the Division of Securities and introduced
into the legislature by the Comptroller incorporated most of the
provisions proposed by the Council and was grounded in the study
prepared by the Reporter. The bill passed and was subsequently
approved by Governor Askew on June 28, 1978. For the first time
in American history, blue sky laws had been amended by a legisla-
ture which looked to the economic impact of regulation.
46. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 68.
47. See Mofsky, The Florida Securities Act, in THF FLORIDA SEcuRImEs ACr (Fla. Bar ed.
1978).
48. Id. at 1.2.
49. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168, § 2(w) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1977)).
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I1. THE REGULATORY PHILOSOPHY OF THE FLORIDA SECURITIES ACT
The legislative history of the Florida Securities Act reveals a
deliberate effort to reduce the economic waste incident to blue sky
regulation. Both the Council's study and the cost/benefit criteria of
the sunset law support constructions of the Florida Securities Act
which promote an efficient and free market. 0 Three principal poli-
cies can be isolated that ought to be applied in construing the stat-
ute.
A. Cost Minimization
When there are ambiguities in the language of the Florida Se-
curities Act, the goal of promoting an efficient market should be
reflected by adopting that construction which minimizes the cost to
the participants in the capital market: namely, investors, issuers,
and underwriters. Such a construction will benefit the general pub-
lic as well as market participants because the direct costs to inves-
tors or costs to issuers or underwriters, which are passed on to inves-
tors as indirect costs will be reduced, and investors will thereby
experience less dilution of their equity investment.5 Issuers will
benefit from decreased costs because they can better compete with
issuers that are exempt from the regulation. Underwriters benefit
because they can increase the number of financings they currently
undertake. Many issuers who could not economically afford public
financing under prior law, but who will now be able to sustain the
decreased cost of public financing, will increase the business of the
underwriters. The public will benefit as the surplus arising from
decreased costs becomes available for further investment and thus
for the production of useful goods.5"
Formerly, the vague notion of "investor protection" was identi-
50. Compare FLA. STAT. § 11.61(4) (1977) with Mofsky, supra note 6, at 5. See also
Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 13.
51. See Mofsky, supra note 47, at 1.2.
52. Although there are aspects of the Florida Securities Act which have an adverse
economic impact, many of the reforms are expected to reduce the regulatory burden on issuers
and investors. In comparison with legislative activity in the rest of the nation, the Florida
reform excels in this latter respect. See Manning, Too Much Law: Our National Disease, 33
Bus. LAW. 435 (1977). It is interesting to note that these positive changes came about as a
result of the pressures created by sunset legislation. A commissioned study of the ABA has
advocated similar legislation at the federal level. See ABA COMM. ON LAw AND THE ECONOMY,
FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFOaM 139-40 (Tent. Draft, Aug. 5, 1978). The Commission
opined that the goal of protecting the existence of a free market could be achieved only by
rigorous analysis of existing regulation and by the enactment of curative legislation based
upon the information generated by such analysis. Id. at 133-34.
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fled as being the dominant concern of securities laws. 3 The empha-
sis of the Florida Securities Act upon an efficient and free market,
however, displaces this philosophy. It was possible to conclude
under prior law that greater investor protection was desirable re-
gardless of the costs imposed by such regulation. 4 Under present
law, the costs of the regulation must not exceed its probable bene-
fits. Thus, where a particular individual has committed an abuse,
the appropriate response is now the identification and punishment
of the individual, not the promulgation of burdensome requirements
to be imposed upon the entire securities industry. If an unscrupu-
lous issuer has cheated an investor of $1,000, the issuer should be
prosecuted, but neither the courts nor the regulators should formu-
late rules which will cost other law-abiding issuers great sums to
comply with, especially since the costs will be passed on to inves-
tors.
B.. Emphasis on Enforcement
The Council's study exposed the inadequacy of the existent
disclosure provisions as a means of combating fraud." The drafts-
men of the Florida Securities Act attempted to remedy this problem
by allocating the Division of Securities' resources towards enforce-
ment of the antifraud provisions of the Florida Securities Act. This
was accomplished by providing broad exemptions from the registra-
tion provisions so that most offerings would be exempted from regis-
tration. Because some of the newly exempted issues are subject to
the scrutiny of the SEC, the task of duplicating the efforts of the
federal agency was eliminated. For example, new section
517.061(19) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) exempts from regis-
tration all securities which are registered with the SEC. Thus, the
Division will now be able to reassign most of its personnel, including
many who were formerly engaged in registration processing and
merit regulation, to enforcement.
C. Optimum Disclosure
The Florida Securities Act almost entirely abrogates the merit
philosophy of securities regulation in favor of a disclosure philoso-
phy. When an issue is registered pursuant to the Securities Act of
53. See Mofsky, supra note 6, at 4.
54. Compare Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is there Merit in the Merit Requirements, 1976
Wis. L. REV. 79 with Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 13.
55. See Mofsky, supra note 6, at 17-19.
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1933, the issue becomes exempt from the registration requirements
of the Florida Securities Act. 6 The disclosure philosophy of the
Florida Securities Act is satisfied because the federal requirements
are deemed to exact sufficient disclosure for purposes of investor
protection. There are also other occasions when registration is not
required. For example, pursuant to the new private placement ex-
emption no formal registration process, with the attendant burden
of the merit standards, is involved. 7 Although disclosure is still
required in most private placements, the burden has been somewhat
alleviated because the investors in a private placement should have
sufficient bargaining power over an issuer to exact from him the
kind of information they deem useful."
1m[I. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
A. What is a Security?
The Florida Securities Act preserves the former definition of
the term "security."'" Because any analysis of securities problems
hinges upon the construction of that term, the definition was
adopted almost verbatim in order to promote certainty in the prac-
tice of securities law. Thus, the definition of a security as an
"investment contract" continues to prevail. 0 During the survey pe-
riod, however, the Florida courts altered the test of investment con-
tracts and hence have changed the scope of transactions deemed to
involve securities.
The framework for analysis of investment contracts under both
the Florida and the federal securities laws was established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the seminal case of SEC v.
WJ. Howey Co."' In Howey, purchasers of orange grove acreage
were induced to enter service contracts with the seller whereby the
seller cultivated and marketed the oranges and divided the profits
pro rata among the purchaser-owners. The Court stated that
56. See FLA. STAT. § 517.061(19) (Supp. 1978).
57. See Id. § 517.061(11), discussed in text accompanying notes 142-147 supra.
58. See note 23 supra.
59. See FLA. STAT. § 517.021(14) (Supp. 1978).
60. "Investment contract" is one of several catch-all phrases included in statutory defini-
tions of securities in order to prevent evasions of regulation by issuers who labeled the inter-
ests they marketed as something other than "stocks" or "bonds." See Mofsky, Some Com-
ments on the Expanding Definition of "Security," 27 U. MAMI L. REv. 395, 397 (1973).
61. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (construing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976)). The Howey rule has been
adopted by the Florida state courts. See, e.g., Levine v. I.R.E. Properties, Inc., 344 So. 2d
938, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693, 695
(Fla. 2d DCA 1969), aff'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
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whether the purchasers had entered investment contracts should be
determined in the following manner: "The test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. "62
1. THE COMMON ENTERPRISE REQUIREMENT
In Howey, the common enterprise requirement of the invest-
ment contract test was satisfied because the purchasers' properties
had been pooled and their profits shared on a pro rata basis. For
many years, analysis of the common enterprise quadrant of the
Howey test centered upon whether a scheme of financing involved
some pooling of the investors' interests. 3 Under this analysis, a
common enterprise is not present if the property and profits of the
individual investors are segregated, even when one promoter man-
ages many such investments. 4
Consistent with this analysis of the Howey test was the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc." In Milnarik, a single pro-
moter's management of many separate discretionary commodities
futures accounts" did not constitute transactions in securities be-
cause there had been no pooling of the accounts. 7 Mr. Justice Ste-
vens, then a circuit court judge, wrote:
We find the element of commonality absent here. Although the
complaint does allege that [the broker] entered into similar dis-
cretionary arrangements with other customers, the success or fail-
ure of those other contracts had no direct impact on the profita-
bility of [the investor's] contract. [The broker's] various cus-
62. 328 U.S. at 301.
63. See Mofsky, supra note 60, at 399. But see 1 L. Loss, SacuRrrms REGULATION 489 (2d
ed. 1961); Borton & Abrahams, Options on Commodity Futures Contracts as Securities in
California, 29 Bus. LAW. 867, 872 (1974); Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security"
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. LAw. 493, 502-09 (1967).
64. See generally Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical
Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and
the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. Rzv. 407, 415-22 (1973).
65. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
66. Discretionary accounts in commodities futures are brokerage accounts whereby the
broker, as agent, purchases options to buy commodities at a specified price at a future date
for the investor.
67. 457 F.2d at 277-78 n.7, .(quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 320 F. Supp. 1149,
1151-53 (N.D. 1l1. 1970)). The Seventh Circuit subsequently stated: "It is apparent then that
this Court's decision in Milnarik was based on the assumption that a sharing or pooling of
funds is required by Howey . Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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tomers were represented by a common agent, but they were not
joint participants in the same investment enterprise."8
For example, the account of one investor, which consisted of ply-
wood futures, might have produced profits even though another
investor's account, consisting of cocoa futures, had produced losses.
Because the profits and losses of any given account would not have
had any common impact, the scheme was held not to have involved
a common enterprise."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit en-
larged the commonality concept in a manner compatible with
Milnarik in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 70 In Koscot, the Fifth
Circuit expanded the common enterprise concept beyond notions of
pooled interests or pro rata returns. Koscot involved a pyramid
scheme whereby the success of the investment of each person de-
pended on the promoter's efficacy in selling distributorships to other
investors. In ruling as to whether the relationship between the inves-
tors constituted a common enterprise, the court decided: "The criti-
cal factor is not the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but
rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts."', Since
any failure of the promoter would spell ruin for every investor in the
pyramid scheme, the Fifth Circuit held that the plan of financing
involved the commonality required by Howey. The decisions in
Koscot and Milnarik were compatible because the test in both was
whether the promoter's actions had a uniform impact upon the
prospects of the groups of investors.
The Fifth Circuit abandoned the rationale of Milnarik and
Koscot in SEC v. Continental Commodities, Corp.72 and chose to
pronounce a sweeping rule rather than to evaluate critically the
scheme involved. In Continental Commodities, a broker had pro-
moted discretionary accounts in options on commodities futures
contracts to many investors." The broker carried naked options in
68. 457 F.2d at 276-77.
69. See note 67 supra.
70. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at.478.
72. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. Discretionary accounts in commodities futures options are brokerage accounts
whereby a broker sells options on commodities futures contracts. A commodities futures
contract is an option to buy or to sell a quantity of commodities at a specified price on some
future date. Commodities options are securities subject to the registration provisions of the
blue sky laws. See Wee Mac Corp. v. State, 301 So. 2d 101 (Fla; 3d DCA 1974). A discretion-
ary account in commodities options involves the purchase and sale of options on commodities
futures by the broker for the account. It is common for brokers to act as principals in the
sale of such options to the account by purchasing for the customer options which the broker
[Vol. 33:1223
SECURITIES. ACT OF 1978
many of these accounts. If too large a number of'investors had
decided to exercise their options, the broker would have been ren-
dered insolvent.7 Thus, the ability of investors holding options with
later maturity dates to satisfy their claims against the broker was
threatened if other investors' accounts were too profitable. On these
facts, a decision that the discretionary accounts are securities would
not necessarily have been inconsistent with Milnarik, since Milnarik
supports the proposition that commonality is present where several
investors are put at a common risk by the actions of the promoter.
In Milnarik, the broker had not risked his own solvency when he,
as agent, purchased futures contracts for his customers, whereas the
broker in Continental Commodities had exposed himself to that
risk. The Fifth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected Milnarik.7 5
The court then held that a common enterprise exists when a
number of investors rely on the judgment of a single promoter:
[Tihe critical inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the
investments collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter
expertise. . . . Lacking the business acumen possessed by pro-
moters, investors inexorably rely on Continental Commodities'
guidance for the success of their investment. . . . That it may
bear more productive fruits in the case of some options than it
does in cases of others should not vitiate the essential fact that
the success of the trading enterprise as a Whole and customer
investments individually is contingent upon the sagacious invest-
ment counseling of Continental Commodities.7
Thus, the court confused the critical importance of the promoter's
solvency with a notion of promoter sagacity. The court, therefore,
has written. If a broker writes an option when he does not own an underlying commodities
futures contract it is called a "naked option." See Schobel & Markham, Commodities Op-
tions-A New Industry or Another Debacle, (1976) 1347 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (spec.
supp.) -2, at 3. The sale of naked options, even outside the context of a discretionary account,
may constitute a sale of securities. See SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628
(9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976).
74. See Schobel & Markham, supra note 73, at 3 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93
Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1974)).
75. See 497 F.2d at 521.
76. Id. at 522-23. The Fifth Circuit purported tW adhere to its earlier decision in Koscot
in pronouncing the broad rule of Continental Commodities. It quoted the following language
to support its holding:
"[T]he fact that an investor's return is independent of that of other investors in
the scheme is not decisive. Rather, the requisite commonality is evidenced by the
fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the
Koscot (meetings and guidelines on recruiting) prospects and consummating a
sale."
Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d at 522 (quoting Koscot, 497 F.2d at 479).
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rejected the concept that inherent in the Howey test is the require-
ment that investors must rise and fall together upon any given act
of the promoter.
Until recently, it was assumed that Florida courts would adhere
to both the Koscot and Continental Commodities standards rather
than the Milnarik interpretation of the Howey test.77 Thus, in
Sunshine Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp.,7" Judge King of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida applied the
Continental Commodities standard to claims arising under both the
Florida and federal securities laws. In Sunshine Kitchens, one cor-
poration entered into a sale and lease-back arrangement with an-
other corporation. The purchaser-lessor attempted to establish that
a common enterprise existed under the Continental Commodities
standard. The commonality requirement of the Howey test was sat-
isfied, argued the purchaser, because the purchaser's expected prof-
its were economically interwoven with the success of the seller-
lessee.
The purchaser's argument was not squarely within Continental
Commodities, which had involved numerous investors, but more
closely resembled the doctrine accepted in Huberman v. Denny's
Restaurants, Inc.5 In Huberman, the court held that a common
enterprise existed in a scheme involving only one promoter and one
investor because the success of the investor was tied to that of the
promoter. The commonality was not between investors but between
promoter and investor. Under this test, apparently most investment
involves a common enterprise because investors are invariably re-
liant on promoters. To adopt Huberman would be largely to elimi-
nate the commonality requirement of the Howey test. 0
Judge King rejected the argument that commonality was pres-
ent where a single investor relied upon a promoter. Although the
court held that the Continental Commodities standard was control-
ling on both the Florida and federal definitions of securities, it held
that the facts indicated an absence of commonality under the
Continental Commodities standard. The court likened the common
77. Since the federal definition of "security" was taken from the prevailing blue sky
definition circa 1933 (the heyday of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act), it is substantially
the same as the Florida definition. Federal cases construing the term therefore have a compel-
lingly persuasive effect upon Florida courts. See State v. Fried, 357 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1978).
78. 403 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (King, J.), cited with approval in Levine v. I.R.E.
Properties, Inc., 344 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
79. 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
80. See Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590, 593 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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enterprise requirement of the Howey test to a wheel, with the inves-
tors as the spokes and the promoter or third party as the hub. "The
Continental Commodities Court was unconcerned that one spoke
was not connected to any other spoke, but this does not mean that
a common enterprise may exist with a hub and only one spoke as
[the purchaser] would have the court find."'" Thus, it appeared
that Continental Commodities had become an accepted standard
for commonality under Florida law.8"
Recent decisions of two Florida district courts of appeal raise
doubts as to which standard of commonality will govern the invest-
ment contract test under Florida law. In the first of these decisions,
Blacker v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 9 the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held that discretionary brokerage accounts in
commodities straddles" were not securities even when a single pro-
moter handled many such accounts. The Third District explicitly
adopted the rationale of Milnarik, quoting profusely from the
Milnarik opinion." Continental Commodities was distinguished by
the court in a citation."
It is possible to conclude from Blacker that the Third District,
for purposes of Florida blue sky law, has limited Continental
Commodities to its own facts. Blacker may legitimately be distin-
guished from Continental Commodities on the basis of the differ-
ences between the underlying transactions in the cases. In
Continental Commodities, the promoter was brokering naked op-
tions on commodities futures. In Blacker, however, the broker
merely acted as an agent in purchasing existing commodities fu-'
tures contracts in the form of straddles. Where, as in Continental
Commodities, the common agent places his own solvency at risk by
brokering naked options, the broker's ability to satisfy the subse-
quent claims of other investors is in jeopardy.87 Where a broker acts
81. 403 F. Supp. at 722.
82. See Louv, Developments in Florida Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, 1977
Developments in Florida Law, 32 U. Mim L. REv. 931, 971-74 (1978).
83. 358 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
84. A commodities straddle is the purchase of an option to buy commodities at a price
prevailing on a particular commodities market at a future date and the purchase of an option
to sell commodities on a different market on the same date. A straddle thus involves the
purchase of two futures contracts issued by a party other than the broker of the discretionary
account. A double option, however, may constitute a security. See SEC v. Commodity Op-
tions Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. See id. at 1148-49.
86. Id. at 1149.
87. See Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINas L.J. 219, 269-74 passim (1974); Long, Commodity Op-
tions-Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 75, 82-102 (1975).
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merely as an agent in purchasing commodities straddles for-an
investor, however, the broker has put nothing at risk which would
dampen the prospects of other investors. Under this reading of
Blacker, it may be that the Third District will adhere to Continental
Commodities in appropriate instances.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, cast a similar
doubt upon the viability of the Continental Commodities standard
under the Florida blue sky laws in Brown v. .Rairigh. 18 In Brown, an
owner of race horses sold a single investor a ten percent interest in
the horses. The investor was obligated to pay ten percent of all bills
and stake fees in connection with racing the horses and was to
receive ten percent of any winnings. The seller retained custody and
control of the horses. The Fourth District held that the seller did not
violate the blue sky laws because the presence of only one investor
failed to satisfy the common enterprise requirement of the Howey
test.'
.On its facts, the decision does nothing more than adopt the
holding of Sunshine Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp." The curious rea-
soning of Brown, however, has broader ramifications for the com-
mon enterprise requirement of the Howey test as applied by Florida
courts. The Fourth District identified three distinct lines of cases
dealing with the definition of "common enterprise." First, the court
noted the standard of Milnarik and Blacker which "requires some
kind of joint participation or dependency between investors. ""
Next, the court considered the Koscot commonality standard,
which is satisfied by the mutual dependence of the investors upon
the promoter in securing additional investors. Finally, the court
noted the Huberman standard, which is satisfied by a showing that
a single investor and promoter shared a common risk. By evaluating
these standards, the Fourth District established the following two-
pronged test:
[W]e adopt the view that not only should there be more than
one investor, but there should be some form of interaction be-
tween investors, or, in the alternative, if there is no such interac-
tion between the investors then the success of the enterprise
should be dependent upon obtaining a number of investors.2
88. 363 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
89. Id. at 593.
90. 403 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
91. 363 So. 2d at 592 (citing Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972);
Blacker v. Shearson Haydon Stone, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).
92. 363 So. 2d at 593.
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Thus, the Fourth District defined a continuum stretching from
Huberman to Koscot to Milnarik and held that only transactions
involving elements found on the Koscot-Milnarik end of the spec-
trum possessed the requisite commonality. If Continental
Commodities were placed along that continuum, however, it proba-
bly would be positioned between Huberman and Koscot. Thus, one
possible interpretation of Brown is that the Continental
Commodities standard will not be controlling on Florida's invest-
ment contract test. Another view of Brown, however, is that the
Fourth. District considered the Continental Commodities standard
as being so similar to the Koscot approach that both tests come
within the second prong of the Brown test. This interpretation ex-
plains the court's failure to mention Continental Commodities.
The ambiguity in Brown was not dispelled by the Fourth Dis-
trict in the subsequent case of LeChateau Royal Corp. v. Pantaleo. ,3
In LaChateau Royal, the selling agent of a condominium developer
entered into a secret agreement with a purchaser of three units to
resell the units on behalf of the purchaser prior to the closing date.
The Fourth District held that there was no sale of securities on the
basis that only one purchaser was involved in the scheme. As a
result, commonality was lacking under the Brown rule. The court
stated that "the common enterprise envisioned in an investment
contract requires more than one investor, and some interaction be-
tween the investors or a showing that the success of the enterprise
would be dependent upon obtaining a number of investors." 9' The
court thus seems to ignore or disapprove of Continental
Commodities.
2. THE ECONOMIC REALITY TEST
In Howey, the Supreme Court established that the substance
of a transaction, rather than its form, governs the question of
whether securities have been sold. The Court in Howey praised
those state courts which had construed the term "security" so that
"form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon
economic reality.""9 Thus, the Court held that the land sales in
Howey were incidental to the investment objective set forth in the
service contracts." The economic reality test has since occupied an
93. 1978 FLA. L. WEEKLY 1567 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 8) (No. 77-326).
94. Id. at 1568.
95. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
96. The Court stated:
[T]he transactions in this case clearly involve investment contracts as so de-
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important role in determining what is or is not a security. In some
contexts application of the test has brought transactions within the
regulatory scheme,97 while in others its application has resulted in
a finding that units, such as common stock, should be deemed out-
side the definition of securities. 8
a. Beneficial Interests in Trusts
During the survey period, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that some purported investment contracts were not
securities under the economic reality test. In Wiener v. Brown,9 a
real estate broker executed a purchase of unimproved real estate on
behalf of twenty-five other persons. Instead of a commission, the
broker received a 4.77% interest in a trust into which the land was
placed. The purchasers named the broker as trustee and authorized
the broker to negotiate a favorable resale of the property on behalf
of the purchaser-beneficiaries. The beneficiaries, however, retained
the right to reject a proposed resale if one third of them objected.
Under a literal reading of Howey this transaction can be held
to involve a sale of securities. The beneficiaries had invested in the
land with an expectation of profits to be derived solely through the
efforts of the broker to negotiate favorable resale. Although the form
of the transaction thus satisfied the Howey criteria, the purchasers
retained substantive managerial control over the resale of the prop-
erty. The purchasers were not merely passive investors who lacked
fined. The respondent companies are offering something more than fee simple
interests in land, something different from a farm or orchard coupled with man-
agement services. They are offering this opportunity to contribute money and to
share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned
by respondents. They are offering this opportunity to persons who reside in dis-
tant localities and who lack the equipment and experience requisite to the cultiva-
tion, harvesting and marketing of the citrus products. Such persons have no desire
to occupy the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment. Indeed, individual development of the
plots of land that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due
to their small size. Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated
and developed as component parts of a large area. A common enterprise managed
by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is there-
fore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on
their investments. Their respective shares in this enterprise are evidenced by land
sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a convenient method of deter-
mining the investors' allocable shares of the profits. The resulting transfer of
rights in land is purely incidental.
Id. at 299-300.
97. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
98. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
99. 356 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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a voice in the disposition of the underlying property, but were the
masters of their own destinies.
The Third District held that the trust arrangement did not
involve securities in view of the substance of the transaction. The
court relied heavily upon the affidavit of a law professor who had
analyzed the transaction under both state and federal precedent.
The affiant had noted that, "the intention of the parties was to
purchase certain real estate, and the fact that they did so by taking
title in the name of trustees instead of taking title in the names of
all the purchasers was to simplify the purchase and the subsequent
sale thereof."'" Although the court did not cite SEC v. Royal
Hawaiian Management Corp."0' as its authority, the Third District
in effect adopted the Royal Hawaiian rule.
Wiener should be contrasted with the earlier decision of the
Third District in Levine v. I.R.E. Properties, Inc.'12 In Levine, a
purchaser of an apartment complex was induced by the seller to
enter into a contract whereby the seller would manage the property
subsequent to the sale. The service agreement was cancellable upon
thirty days notice by the purchaser. The seller persuaded the trial
court that the termination provision vested such control in the pur-
chaser that he could not be held to have relied solely on the efforts
of the seller. The Third District reversed, holding that the cancella-
tion provision was not conclusive as to the economic realities which
underlay the transaction.
A conclusion which may tentatively be drawn from a compari-
son of Wiener and Levine is that it is the degree of control rather
than the exclusivity of control which is the essence of the economic
reality test. Under the literal language of Howey, profits were in fact
to be generated solely by the promoters' efforts in both Wiener and
Levine. The purchasers in both cases were not perceived as active
participants in resale or maintenance of the respective properties.
The crucial distinction between the cases is that Wiener involved
an arrangement whereby investors were in a position to monitor
each important decision made by the promoter. The investors in
Wiener could overrule a particular decision of the promoter yet
continue to enjoy his services, whereas the investors in Levine could
only act to cancel the management contract. Apparently, it is not a
sufficient indicium of control that investors may remove manage-
ment, but rather that investors must be in a position to reject the
100. Id. at 1305.
101. [1966-67 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Ra. (CCH) 91,982 (D.C. Cal. 1967).
102. 344 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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management decisions of the promoter while still retaining the pro-
moter's services.
b. Promissory Notes
The status of promissory notes as securities has been deter-
mined by a test similar to the economic realities test. The United
States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit has consistently held
that the status of promissory notes as securities depends upon
whether or not the notes were issued for commercial or investment
purposes.'3 In a series of cases, the court has advanced a set of
criteria which act to distinguish commercial notes from invest-
ments. These criteria demonstrate that the investment-commercial
test is actually an inquiry into the economic reality of the transac-
tion rather than a mechanistic application of formal definitions.
In State v. Fried, 10 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
upheld the dismissal of a criminal indictment handed down for both
antifraud violations and failure to register two promissory notes, on
the grounds that the notes were not securities under the statutory
definition. The notes had been issued by a corporation which se-
cured the obligation with a mortgage on real property. No facts
concerning the circumstances underlying the issuance of the notes
were stated in the opinion of the Third District. Rather, both the
trial court and the Third District examined the resale of the note
and concluded that the resale arose out of a commercial loan be-
cause the defendant's sale was an isolated transaction.
Although the language of the opinion is couched in the eco-
nomic realities test of United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman,'15 the realities of the underlying transaction were largely
ignored. The court clearly attempted to determine whether the note
103. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v.
First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974). For discussions of the investment-commercial
test of notes under the federal securities laws, see Brown, Nordwall & Ashner, Corporate,
Securities and Banking Law Aspects of Workouts, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 979, 998-99 (1978); Hicks, Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under
Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 227 (1976); Lipton & Katz,
"Notes"Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAw. 763 (1975); Pollock, Notes Issued in Syndi-
cated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32 Bus. LAw. 537 (1977); Comment, Notes as
Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD.
L. REV. 233 (1976); Comment, When Is a Note a Security?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 757
(1978); Comment, The Status of Promissory Notes Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 52 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 92 (1977); 30 VAND. L. Rlv. 110
(1977).
104. 357 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
105. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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was a security at the level .of secondary distribution without regard
to the context surrounding the issuance of the note. The fact that
the sale by the note holder was isolated was of controlling signifi-
cance.
The investment-commercial test, however, should not be deter-
mined by reference to secondary distributions. An investment note
should not be deemed to acquire the attributes of a commercial note
merely because it finds its way into the hands of an individual who
has never previously held commercial paper. Although that individ-
ual's resale of the note may qualify for exemption under the isolated
sale exemption,'" the note continues to be a security, and the indi-
vidual will be liable for antifraud violations if he makes material
misstatements to the purchaser of the note." 7 The fact that a sale
of notes by an issuer is an isolated occurrence may bear on the
question of whether a note is a security, but the isolated nature of
sales by holders of the note are only relevant in regard to the applic-
ability of a particular exemption from registration for the resale of
the security. The confusion of these two concepts in Fried has been
criticized by a member of the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance.log
B. Registration Procedures
The Florida Securities Act retains section 517.07 of the Florida
Statutes in much the same form as it existed under the Sale of
Securities Law. Thus, the familiar principle that all securities must
be registered before they are offered and sold unless they are exempt
securities or are offered in an exempt transaction is still the govern-
ing principle. 09 It is the procedures for registration which have been
changed.
Under prior law, there were three available registration proce-
dures: registration by announcement, coordination, and qualifica-
tion. Registration by announcement applied only to secondary dis-
106. See FLA. STAT. § 517.061(3) (Supp. 1978), discussed in section III(D)(2) infra.
107. The antifraud provisions of the blue sky law apply to all transactions regardless of
whether the securities being sold are exempt from registration.
108. See 1 BLUE SKY L. Rzp. (CCH) 13,691.
109. FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (Supp. 1978). It should be noted that a similar principle exists
under federal law. Thus, in all offerings in which the facilities of interstate commerce are
employed, securities must be registered prior to offer or sale unless a federal exemption
applies. Failure to register with the federal authorities will not be excused by virtue of the
fact that an exemption from registration exists under state law. Conversely, registration
under state law is'not excused merely because a federal exemption applies to a sale. An issuer
can be criminally convicted and is liable for civil penalties even for an innocent failure to
register securities which he has sold. See State v. Houghtaling, 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1966).
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tributions of the securities of large successful public firms by per-
sons other than issuers, underwriters or controlling persons. "' Regis-
tration by coordination was only provided for the initial offerings of
such firms."' Neither procedure is available under the Florida Se-
curities Act. Not only are the procedures rarely used, but sections
of the Florida Securities Act provide exemptions from registration
for almost all the offerings to which these procedures would have
applied." 2
The sole remaining registration procedure is registration by
qualification." 3 New section 517.081 of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1978), adopts almost verbatim the former section covering this pro-
cedure. Section 517.081(7) provides that the Department of Banking
and Finance shall only record the registration of those securities
when the sale would be fair, just and equitable, would not be fraud-
ulent and when the enterprise of the issuer is based upon sound
business principles. Thus, the full panoply of merit regulation is
carried forward to all those offerings which must be registered in
Florida. Yet, the great expansion of the scope of the registration
exemptions will enable most sales of securities to escape the perils
of merit regulation.
C. Exempt Securities
"Exempt securities" are statutorily defined classes of securities
which are exempt from registration regardless of the form of the
transaction in which they are offered and sold."' Many classes of
exempt securities under prior law are retained intact by the Florida
Securities Act." 5 Others, however, have been dramatically changed.
110. FLA. STAT. § 517.091 (1977) (repealed 1978).
111. Id. § 517.08.
112. Registration by announcement was not very helpful since secondary distributions
through brokers were practically constrained by SEC rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
The rules promulgated under the new isolated sale exemption, FLA. STAT. § 517.061(3) (Supp.
1978), provide that transactions which satisfy the requirements of rule 144 will be lawful in
Florida. See rule 3 E-5.02(A)(ii), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,642. Similarly, no one will mourn
the absence of the coordination procedures because new FLA. STAT. § 517.061(19) (Supp. 1978)
exempts from registration all of those securities which in the past would have been subject
to the coordination procedures. See text accompanying notes 246-249 infra.
113. Because only one procedure exists now, FLA. STAT. § 517.081 (Supp. 1978) is simply
captioned "Registration Procedure."
114. Although such securities are exempt from the registration provisions of the Florida
Securities Act, offerors or sellers of such securities are still liable for violations of the antifraud
provisions which they commit in connection with offers or sales of exempt securities. Addi-
tionally, offerors or sellers must either register such securities with federal authorities prior
to an offer or sale, or couple the Florida exemption with the federal exemption when interstate
commerce facilities are employed.
115. The exemptions for domestic government securities have not been materially al-
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1. EXCHANGE LISTED SECURITIES
Two of the categories of exempt securities under prior law were
comprised of exchange listed securities. Repealed section 517.05(6)
of the Florida Statutes (1977) classified securities listed on the ex-
change of any city with more than one million inhabitants, the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the Chi-
cago Board of Trade, as exempt as long as all classes of the securities
of the issuer remained listed. 16 A separate exemption was provided
for securities listed on any other "recognized and responsible" ex-
change which had been approved by the Department of Banking
and Finance."7
If applied to initial offerings, the exemption could be abused by
unscrupulous issuers. By distributing their stock on unregulated
local exchanges, the issuers would avoid both disclosure require-
ments and regulatory scrutiny. Unlike privately placed securities,
which traditionally have been deemed beyond regulation due to the
nonpublic nature of the offering, and unlike the securities of heavily
regulated industries, which have been scrutinized by other govern-
ment officials, listed securities were neither philosophically outside
the regulatory field nor already subject to extensive regulation.
Under the Florida Securities Act, issuers, underwriters and control-
ling persons must register such securities unless another exemption
from registration applies."'
Secondary trading in securities listed on an exchange regis-
tered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is an exempt trans-
action under the Florida Securities Act in certain circumstances.
First, the transaction must be made by or on behalf of persons other
than an issuer, underwriter, controlling person or dealer selling part
tered. See FLA. STAT. § 517.05(1) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.051(2) (Supp. 1978)).
Nor have substantive changes been made for: foreign governments' securities, id. § 517.06(2)
(1977) (current version at id. § 517.051(2) (Supp. 1978)); national bank and federal savings
and loan associations' securities, id. § 517.05(3) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.051(3)
(Supp. 1978)); railroad and other public service utilities' securities, id. § 517.05(4) (1977)
(current version at id. § 517.051(4) (Supp. 1978)); nondefaulting issuers' senior securities, id.
§ 517.05(9) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.051(7) (Supp. 1978)); agricultural cooperatives'
securities, id. § 517.05(10) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.051(7) (Supp. 1978)).
116. The Department of Banking and Financing had been authorized to deny the exemp-
tion to securities of a particular issuer by publishing an order to that effect. Id. § 517.05(b)
(1977) (repealed 1978). The effectiveness of this restraint, however, was limited since the
Department rarely could detect intended frauds prior to the initial offering. Thus, this
weapon was aimed principally at secondary trading. Unscrupulous issuers could usually
obtain the full benefit of the exemption.
117. Id. § 5i7.05(7).
118. See id. § 517.061(18)(b) (Supp. 1978).
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of an unsold allotment."' Second, securities and rights to the securi-
ties of the issuer must be listed on such an exchange. Third, the
Department must not have published an order denying the exemp-
tion for the security involved. 10
2. BANKING INSTITUTIONS
The new exemption for securities issued by banking institutions
was expected to greatly expand a similar exemption provided by the
Sale of Securities Law. 2' Repealed section 517.05(8) of the Florida
Statutes (1977) exempted only those securities which represented
an interst in or a direct obligation of state banks, trust companies,
savings institutions, and building or savings and loan associations
organized in and subject to the examination, supervision and con-
trol of the State of Florida. There was no exemption provided for
initial equity subscriptions issued by such institutions.'22
Although no statutory exemption for initial equity subscrip-
tions existed, a rule promulgated by the Department of Banking and
Finance has effectively extended the exemption to such securities. 12 3
These securities were to be deemed exempt under section 517.05(8)
when the organizing directors filed notice prior to sales. The re-
quired information in the notice included such substantive disclo-
sures as: (1) biographical descriptions of the directors; (2) the pro-
posed capital structure; and (3) the intended use of the proceeds.
Additionally, the Division of Securities was empowered to exact on
an ad hoc basis such information as it might deem necessary.
An exemption for the initial equity subscription of domestic
and foreign banks, trust companies, savings institutions, and build-
ing or savings and loan associations is specifically provided in new
section 517.051(5).124 The sole requirement of the exemption is the
119. Id.
120. See text accompanying notes 257-270 infra.
121. The exemption for banking institutions, other than national banking institutions,
which existed under the Sale of Securities Law provided exemption for
[amny security issued by and representing an interest in or a direct obligation
of any state bank, trust company, or savings institution incorporated under the
laws of and subject to the examination, supervision, and control of this state; or
issued by any building and loan association of this state under like supervision.
FLA. STAT. § 517.05(8) (1977) (repealed 1978). Securities issued by national banks were ex-
empt wiithout regard to the conditions required in § 517.05(8). Id. § 517.05(3) (1977) (current
version at id. § 517.051(3) (Supp. 1978)).
. 122. COMMERCE COMM. REPORT ON FLA. H.B. No. 2118, at 4 (May 9, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as "REPORT"].
123. See Rule 3E-20.22, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,689B.
124. Id.
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filing of proper notice prior to sales as specified by the rules of the
Department. The elements of proper notice under the new section
include the same substantive disclosures as those previously re-
quired.'25
In the process of expanding the exemption of initial equity sub-
scriptions, however, the exemption of securities issued by building
or savings and loan associations was limited by the division of sec-
tion 517.051(5) into two parts. The first part relates to all securities
other than initial equity subscriptions; the second covers initial
equity subscriptions only. The subsection was structured in this
manner so that a notice requirement could be placed upon the ex-
emption of initial equity subscriptions without limiting the excep-
tion of other types of securities. The difficulty is that building or
savings and loan associations are listed among the issuers whose
securities are exempt only in the second part. Thus, it would appear
that only the initial equity subscriptions of building or savings and
loan associations are exempt under section 517.051(5) of the Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1978).
No apparent policy supports this construction of the exemp-
tion. There has been no suggestion that the operations of building
or savings and loan associations are different from those of other
banking and savings institutions. Nor can it have been the intention
of the legislature to provide an exemption for the riskiest of securi-
ties (promotional stock) of such issuers and deny exemption to all
other securities of such issuers. A reform of new section 517.051(5)
would be desirable.
The manner in which new section 517.051(5) was drafted also
calls into question the extent of the exemption. The statute appears
to extend the exemption to all domestic and foreign banks subject
to Florida authority regardless of their place of incorporation. Thus,
the phrase, "any domestic or foreign bank,"'' 7 was substituted for
"any state bank . . . incorporated under the laws of . . . this
state."'2 8 It is clear that securities issued by international banking
125. Any security issued by and representing an interest in or a direct obliga-
tion of any domestic or foreign bank, trust company, or savings institution subject
to the examination, supervision, and control of this state; or the initial subscrip-
tion for equity securities in such bank, trust company, savings institution, or
building or savings and loan association of this state under like supervision;
except that the foregoing subscription exemption shall not be available unless and
until proper notice is filed as required by the rules of the department.
FLA. STAT. § 517.051(5) (Supp. 1978).
126. See Rule 3E-20.22, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,684B.
127. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(5) (Supp. 1978).
128. Id. § 517.05(8) (1977) (repealed 1978).
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agencies which have been authorized to maintain facilities in Flor-
ida since January 1, 1978, are exempt under the new statute.' The
status of securities issued by banks organized in other states, how-
ever, has not been changed by the Florida Securities Act.The purported exemption of.securities issued by any domestic
bank is a trap for the unwary. Section 517.051(5) conditions the
applicability of this exemption to banks which are subject to the
examination, supervision and control of the State of Florida. Bank-
ing corporations operating facilities in other states, however, are
prohibited from conducting a general banking business in Florida. 30
Such banks may only undertake certain activities in this state
which are incidental to the business of banking and which are not
peculiar to banking corporations.'' Because these banks are not
permitted to do a general business in Florida, they are not regulated
in their capacity as banking corporations by the Department. 32 The
securities of domestic banks located in other states are, therefore,
not exempt. Prior to the last legislative session, international bank-
ing agencies located in other states were permitted to maintain
offices in Florida. Such agencies may now operate either in Florida
or in another state.' s Thus, foreign banks will enjoy no greater ex-
emption for sales of securities than do domestic banks.
3. RELIGIOUS AND ELEEMOSYNARY CORPORATIONS
Traditionally, the securities laws have provided competitive
advantages in capital markets to charitable and religious organiza-
tions. In recent years, however, the Division of Securities became
129. REPoRT, supra note 122, at 4. The statutory authority for international banking
agencies in Florida is relatively new. See 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-157, §§ 1, 3 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 659.67 (1977)), discussed in Baena & Romanchuck, Banking Law: A Survey of Florida
Developments, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U. MiAhn L. REv. 763, 765-69 (1978);
Murray, Commercial Law, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 839, 866-
67 (1978).
130. See [1959-60] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 456.
131. "Foreign banks," including all banks located in other states, may do the following:
(1) contract with a lender to acquire a portion of the interest or the security; (2) enter
mortgage servicing contracts with persons authorized to transact business in this state; (3)
exercise the rights of a mortgagee with regard to property held by the bank as security. FLA.
STAT. § 659.57 (1977).
132. The statutory provisions for the examination, supervision and control are contained
in FLA. STAT. §§ 658.05-11 (1977). The operant terms in the Banking Code governing the class
of banking corporations subject to regulatory scrutiny by Florida authorities are "bank,"
"state bank," and "commercial bank," id. § 658.02(1), (2),(3), none of which refer to domestic
banks located in other states. See [1959-60] FiA. Avr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 456.
133. See Baena & Murray, Banking Law, 1978 Developments in Florida Lalb, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 757 (1979).
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alarmed that these issuers were using the exemption as a means of
defrauding the public.
For instance, the case of In re Skekinah Cloister Christian
Church, Inc. '" illustrates the type of fraudulent practices common
under the exemption. There, Reverend Walker obtained over
$700,000 through the sale of securities on behalf of the Beaches
Chapel Christian Church. The offering circular did not mention
prior outstanding debts against Walker, nor the fact that his ordina-
tion had been revoked. Furthermore, the addition in the circular
was incorrect and profit figures were misrepresented, as were the
figures for the church's weekly attendance and the valuation of
recently acquired property. The net result was to give the church a
positive net worth and cash flow when the opposite was true.'35
As a result of these and other abuses the Comptroller was able
to find that Walker had failed to perfect his claim to an exemption,
and a cease and desist order issued.' 0 The fact that it took this kind
of gross abuse to take the case out of the statutory exemption indi-
cates why the exemption has been greatly contracted by the Florida
Securities Act.
Under prior law, the securities of religious or charitable corpo-
rations were exempt during both the initial offering and secondary
trading as long as the issuer provided the offerees with written re-
ports concerning the feasibility of the project and the method of
financing.'37 No further attention to the registration provisions of
the blue sky laws was required by the issuer or the shareholders
trading their stock.
The amendment of this exemption in the Florida Securities Act
changes a class of exempt securities into a class of exempt transac-
tions. New section 517.051(8) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978)
only provides exempt status to securities issued by religious or char-
itable corporations when all offers or sales are made exclusively by
an offering circular containing full and fair disclosure, as prescribed
by rules of the Department of Banking and Finance. Since each
134. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,405 (Order of the Florida Comptroller).
135. Id. at 68,313.
136. Id. at 68,314.
137. The exemption from registration under the Sale of Securities Law extended to
[any security issued by a corporation organized exclusively for religious, educa-
tional, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for pe-
cuniary profit, and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private stockholder or individual, and provided that each offeree receives a
written report as to the feasibility of the project and the full disclosure of the
method of financing.
FLA. STAT. § 517.05(5) (1977) (repealed 1978).
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person must communicate offers only through an offering circular,
persons other than the issuer must prepare disclosure documents
before secondary trading in such securities occurs. Because ordinary
shareholders usually will not be in a position to obtain all the infor-
mation in a form necessary to prepare a document containing full
and fair disclosure, this exemption probably will be successfully
utilized only by issuers and controlling persons.
Under the new rules promulgated by the Department there
are different requirements for offerings exceeding $250,000. The
disclosure requirements for offerings involving less than $250,000
are extremely limited. They do, however, appear to be more
extensive than the disclosure requirements which existed under
the Sale of Securities Law.r The requirements for offerings
exceeding $250,000 are both numerous and vague.'39
The manner in which sales by persons other than issuers will
be integrated is unclear. Thus, whether any particular offering in-
volves less than $250,000 raises a perplexing problem. The only
integration standards which have been officially adopted under the
new blue sky law pertain to exempt transactions under section
517.061(11)(d) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978).110 Until stan-
dards applicable to the offerings of the securities of eleemosynary
corporations are adopted, the only relief available to persons intend-
ing to offer such securities is to petition the Department for a decla-
ratory statement."'
D. Exempt Transactions
The most remarkable feature of the Florida Securities Act is the
improvement of the provisions for exempt transactions."2 Through
both the legislative amendment and administrative rulemaking pro-
cesses Florida authorities have greatly developed the law of exempt
transactions during the survey period.
138. Compare id. (written feasibility report and disclosure of the method of financing)
with Rule 3E-4.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,631.
139. Rule 3E-4.01 provides extremely truncated descriptions of the categories of informa-
tion required. It has been observed by others that the reason for such brief descriptions was
that the Division of Securities was seeking to avoid the formalistic practice of securities
disclosure prevalent in connection with the federal requirements. These rules, however, may
force practitioners to rely upon previously approved documents more than is necessary under
the federal guidelines.
140. Rule 3E-5.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,641.
141. FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1977).
142. "Exempt transactions" are statutorily defined circumstances under which securi-
ties are exempt from registration due to the form of the transaction in which they are being
offered or sold.
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The disarmingly simple character of the blue sky law revisions
is exemplified by the recently adopted integration rule.' The rule
states that no exempt transaction will be integrated with any other
exempt transaction except as specified in the new private placement
exemption."' Attorneys unfamiliar with the vague integration stan-
dards may be led to disregard the impact of integration unless they
are representing an issuer in a private placement. For example, a
tax attorney may counsel a corporate employer to fund a pension
plan with the stock of the corporation without considering the effect
of such sales on the subsequent ability of the corporation to raise
capital through a private placement. Since the rules prescribe that
private placements will only be integrated with sales occurring dur-
ing the 365 day period ending on the date of the last sale of privately
placed stock,' the attorney should have considered privately plac-
ing the stock before funding the pension plan.'
1. PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
The exemption most commonly relied upon by issuers, under
both state and federal law, is the private placement exemption.'47
The confusion generated by the Florida exemption was a source of
143. "Integration" is a principle by which two separate transactions are considered as
one. Under the Sale of Securities Law, most exempt transactions which occurred within 12
months of a post-organization private placement have been automatically integrated. FLA.
STAT. § 517.06(11) (1977) (repealed 1978). The Florida Securities Act appeared to perpetuate
this system, id. § 517.051(11)(d) (Supp. 1978), but relief has been provided through the
interplay of the Department's rules. See Rule 3E-5.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,641;
Rule 3E-5.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,644.
144. Rule 3E-5.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,641.
145. See Rule 3E-5.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,644.
146. Practitioners should also consider the impact of federal integration rules and safe
harbors when advising an issuer of securities. For example, if the facilities of interstate
commerce were used by the employer funding the pension plan with its stock, those securities
must be registered with the SEC unless exempt under federal law. Should the issuer rely upon
either rule 146 or rule 147, the permissible timing of other offerings will differ from an offering
made under the Florida integration rules. Both rules 146 and 147 provide safe harbors from
integration for all offerings made more than six months prior to the first sale and six months
after the last sale of any offering undertaken pursuant to the rule. Thus, if an issuer relies
upon the Florida private placement exemption and rule 146 or 147, he would generally enjoy
a safe harbor from integration only for sales which occurred before the 365-day period prior
to the last sale in the private placement and after the six-month period following the last sale
in the private placement. See text accompanying notes 160-167 infra.
147. Under federal law, an exemption from the registration provision of.§ 5 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 provides: "The provisions of § 5 shall not apply to . . . (2) transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976). The reason for such an
exemption from registration is that the federal securities laws were only intended to compel
full disclosure when issuers entered public capital markets, but not when issuers sold to a
small number of investors. See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1976).
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much dissatisfaction to issuers and their attorneys. The history of
the reform of this blue sky exemption closely parallels its federal
analogue, section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.111 In both cases,
a vague statute was enacted, subjected to differing administrative
interpretations at various times, and examined by a commissioned
study which recommended reform. The confusion surrounding the
Florida exemption which necessitated this reform stemmed from
three basic flaws.
First, the Florida private placement exemption was not in har-
mony with the federal exemption. Under the Sale of Securities Law,
the private placement exemption was divided into one exemption
for pre-organization subscriptions and another for offerings by or-
ganized firms."' Taken together, these two exemptions permitted
sales to twenty-five persons while the firm was in the promotional
stage and sales to twenty persons in any twelve-month period after
the firm was organized. If sales in the pre-organization period oc-
curred within twelve months of the post-organization offering, the
earlier sales were counted toward the twenty-person limitation on
the subsequent offering."' By contrast, the SEC's rule 146 permitted
thirty-five sales within any twelve-month period. 5' This disparity
was troublesome because issuers relying upon both the state and
148. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1976). For many years practitioners struggled with the vague
language of § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which referred to "any public offering."
Rather than simply employ a standard based upon the numbers of investors, the courts have
subjected the language of the exemption to elaborate constructions in order to promote their
perception of the policies underlying the Securities Act of 1933. For example, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the number of investors solicited is not the sole
criterion, but that the exemption will only apply when the particular investors are "able to
fend for themselves." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., .346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). In the meantime,
the SEC was busy issuing releases and no-action letters which raised more questions than
they answered. See 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES §§ 2.2a,
2.3b, 2.3e, 2.4b, 2.4d(1), 2.5d(1), 3.6b(1), 2.8a & 2.9a (1978).
To solve these problems, a study of this and other exemptions was commissioned. A
product of this study was the famous Wheat Report. The Wheat Report proposed a rule which
was further amended and eventually adopted by the SEC as rule 146. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146
(1978).
149. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.06(10), (11) (1977) (repealed 1978). As originally enacted, how-
ever, the Sale of Securities Law provided a private placement exemption solely for
"[s]ubscriptions for the shares of the capital stock of a corporation prior to the incorporation
thereof under the laws of this State, when no expense is incurred, or no commission, compen-
sation or remuneration is paid for or in connection with the sale or disposition of such
securities." 1931 Fla. Laws ch. 14899, § 5. Thus, the exemption was only extended to Florida
corporations in their promotional stage. Two years later a post-incorporation exemption was
provided for Florida corporations. See 1935 Fla. Laws ch. 17253, § 5. It was not until 1959
that the private placement exemption was extended to sales of partnership and trust inter-
ests. See 1959 Fla. Laws ch. 59-170, § 1.
150. See Robinton & Sowards, supra note 6, at 533.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b)(1), (g) (1978).
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federal private placement rules could sell only to the lesser number
of persons.
Second, the Florida exemption made it extremely difficult for
practitioners to determine the number of sales which could lawfully
be made absent registration.'52 The problem existed for two reasons.
The first of these was the manner in which the term "sale" was
defined in the Sale of Securities Law.'53 Since all offers to sell were
included within the definition of sale, the blue sky law prohibited,
at least through the in terrorem effect of the definition, unregistered
sales of securities if verbal or written offers had been made to more
than twenty-five subscribers or to more than twenty offerees of the
securities of an organized firm. This was a serious problem because
an offering usually would be spoiled if the first few persons who
rejected an offer were counted toward the limitation of twenty or
twenty-five persons. The uncertainty under the Sale of Securities
Law with respect to the identity of persons deemed subscribers or
purchasers also made it difficult to determine the number of sales
allowable. For example, the status of promoters as subscribers was
unclearlu Thus, if five businessmen participated equally in the
formation of a corporation, only twenty other subscribers could be
enlisted in order to avoid a possible violation of the law. The federal
exemption contained provisions better defining the identity of pur-
chasers. Under rule 146, persons making bona fide purchases of
more than $150,000 need not be counted towards the limitation of
thirty-five purchasers.'55 Furthermore, when a purchaser caused
relatives living in his household to hold some of the privately
placed securities in their names, only the principal purchaser was
to be counted.'56
A third problem with both private placement exemptions of the
Sale of Securities Law was the absolute ban on compensation and
commissions to anyone other than registered Florida securities deal-
ers. As a practical matter, in most private placements accountants
or other service professionals intervened between issuers and inves-
tors. Rule 146 permitted such "offeree representatives" to receive
commissions from the issuer as long as all such rerhuneration was
152. Practitioners have frequently commented that Florida authorities have sometimes
told them that the limitation applied to offers and at other times said that only ultimate sales
were regulated.
153. FLA. STAT. § 517.02(3) (1977) (repealed 1978). The definition of "sale" included
offers as well as sales.
154. See Robinton & Sowards, supra note 18, at 2-5.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(d) (1978).
156. Id. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(a)-(c).
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disclosed to the offeree prior to a sale.-' 7 The blue sky ban on such
compensation, however, either acted to reduce the number of pri-
vate placements or encouraged violations of the registration provi-
sions.
These three major problems inherent in the private placement
exemptions of the Sale of Securities Law have been solved by the
Florida Securities Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
The practitioner should be cautioned, however, that the applicabil-
ity of the exemption hinges upon strict compliance with all of the
requirements of the new exemption. A discussion of these require-
ments follows.
a. Thirty-five Purchasers
New section 517.061(11) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978)
exempts sales to thirty-five or fewer purchasers in a consecutive
twelve-month period. Thus, the number of offers which may be
made is unlimited; only ultimate sales are limited to thirty-five
purchasers. The statute also defines "offer"'' 8 and "sale"' 59 sepa-
rately. The term "sale," but not the term "offer," is included within
the private placement exemption. Thus, the Florida blue sky law
now permits sales to as many as thirty-five purchasers, without
regard to the number of offers made by the issuer. In addition, the
new blue sky exemption has eliminated the distinction between pre-
organization and post-organization offerings. As a result of these
157. Id. § 230.146(a)(1)(iv).
158. The Florida Securities Act provides: .'Offer to sell,' 'offer for sale,' or 'offer' means
any attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security for value." FLA. STAT. § 517.021(10) (Supp. 1978).
159. The Florida Securities Act provides:
"Sale" or "sell" means any contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value. The term defined in this subsection shall not include
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer or any person on whose
behalf an offering is to be made and any underwriter or among underwriters who
are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer. Any security given or deliv-
ered with, or as a bonus on account of, any pruchase of securities or any other
thing shall be conclusively presumed to constitute a part of the subject of such
purchase and to have been offered and sold for value. The issue or transfer of a
right or privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the
holder of such security the right to convert such security into another security of
the same issuer or of another person or giving a right to subscribe to another
security of the same issuer or of another person, which right cannot be exercised
until some future date, shall not be deemed to be an offer or sale of such other
security; but the issue or transfer of such other security upon the exercise of such
right of conversion or subscription shall be deemed a sale of such other security.
Id. § 517.021(12).
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changes the Florida exemption now closely parallels its federal
counterpart.
For the first time the status of parties as purchasers has been
defined. The statute explicitly excludes from the computation the
number of purchasers making a bona fide investment of $100,000 or
more. '6 Furthermore, according to a rule of the Department of
Banking and Finance, promoters are no longer to be counted in
reaching the limitation of thirty-five purchasers.'61 Pursuant to this
rule, general partners in a limited partnership will not be counted
regardless of the interests they receive in the partnership. Also ex-
cluded from the computation are certain relatives, related business
organizations, and related trusts and estates. Thus, offerings to
more than thirty-five persons may qualify as private placements
provided only thirty-five persons who are deemed purchasers are
involved. ' 2
The new private placement exemption adopts a twelve-month
period for integration with other exempt transactions. During a con-
secutive twelve-month period, therefore, sales of securities in most
other exempt transactions will be eligible for integration into the
limitation of thirty-five purchasers for the private placement ex-
emption."I Rules promulgated during the survey period establish
standards regarding the integration of sales and offers. Rule 3E-5.04
provides that only sales made during the 365-day period ending on
the date on which the last sale in the private placement is made will
be subject to integration."' Exempt transactions other than private
placements which are made at least a day after a private placement
will not be integrated with the private placement offering. Further-
more, only those offers and sales made within the relevant 365-day
period will be integrated if they collectively are a single offering." 5
Thus, the new private placement exemption involves both more
certainty and flexibility than did prior law.
160. Id. § 517.061(11)(b).
161. Rule 3E-5.04(2)(d), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,644. The term "promoter" is
not defined in this rule. It is, however, broadly defined in rule 3E-2.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. RP.
(CCH) 13,612, for the purpose of determining who is an "issuer." Whether this definition
of promoter will apply to rule 3E-5.04 is as yet undetermined.
162. Another important change in the rules governing the computation of purchasers is
that a corporation or other business association which was not formed specifically for the
purpose of acquiring the securities of the issuer will be counted as one purchaser. See rule
3E-5.04(3), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 13,614.
163. Exempt sales by an issuer to a bank or other qualified institutional investor, FLA.
STAT. § 517.061(7) (Supp. 1978), will not be integrated with sales in a private placement. Id.
§ 517.061(11)(d) (Supp. 1978).
164. Rule 3E-5.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,644.
165. Rule 3E-5.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. Rp. (CCH) 13,641.
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Since issuers frequently will rely on section 517.061(11) in con-
junction with rule 146 or rule 147, attention should be given to the
differing provisions for safe harbors from integration in the state
and federal rules. Under rules 146 and 147 a danger zone exists
within six months prior to the first offer or sale made pursuant to
the rule and within six months after the last offer or sale.' Other
offers or sales made within the danger zone will be integrated if
they are part of the same offering as the offers and sales made
pursuant to the rule. Thus, the federal integration standards will
be applied to all offers and sales made six months before and after
the offering, and Florida's integration standards will be applied to
offers and sales made twelve months before the last sale in the
offering.
b. Commissions
The new exemption perpetuates the requirement that no com-
missions or compensation be paid in connection with a private
placement to anyone other than a registered Florida securities
dealer.' A degree of relief from this requirement, however, has been
provided by a rule of the Department of Banking and Finance.
Pursuant to rule 3E-5.06 fees paid by issuers to attorneys, accoun-
tants or evaluatbrs of securities are not deemed compensation for
purposes of the statutory prohibition, if the amount of such fees and
whether they are contingent on pay scale is disclosed to the offeree
prior to the sale. 68 Furthermore, compensation may be paid regard-
less of whether disclosure of such payment has been made if sales
are made outside the State of Florida."' Persons receiving such
commission, however, should determine whether they are subject to
registration as brokers or dealers under local law.
Further reform of this requirement is desirable if Florida citi-
zens are to experience the benefits of an optimum level of private
placements in Florida. In order for issuers to fully utilize this ex-
emption they must be able to provide incentives to those persons in
close contact with sophisticated investors. As a result of restricting
access to these individuals by effectively limiting issuers to commu-
nication through dealers, part of the available market for venture
capital will be cut off. This situation can be remedied and investors
can be protected by allowing commissions to be paid to anyone,
provided that such payment is disclosed to the purchaser.
166. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.146(b)(1), .147(b)(2) (1978).
167. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(a)(3) (Supp. 1978).
168. Rule 3E-5.06(C), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,646.
169. Rule 3E-5.06(A), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,646.
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c. Disclosure
Under the Sale of Securities Law, the pre-organization exemp-
tion did not impose any disclosure requirement, but the post-
organization exemption required the delivery of information con-
cerning "the true financial condition of the issuer, its business oper-
ations, and the use of the proceeds of the sale."'' 0 The Florida Secur-
ities Act, however, provides that offering circulars containing full
and fair disclosure must be furnished to all offerees if securities are
to be sold to more than five persons.'
The rules for computing the number of persons, for purposes of
the disclosure requirements, are the same as the rules for the com-
putation of the persons deemed purchasers. I Thus, where sales are
made to ten promoters, no offering circular need be provided by the
issuer because securities will be deemed to have been sold to five or
less persons for purposes of the statute.
The exemption provides that when less than five persons re-
ceive securities no disclosure is necessary. Prudent issuers and their
attorneys, however, may often choose to provide disclosure in offer-
ings to five or less investors. First, disclosure material should be
provided because the antifraud provisions of the blue sky laws apply
to the offering even though it is an exempt transaction.' Although
section 517.07 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978 'may be satisfied
without disclosure, the issuer and counsel aiding and abetting him
are exposed to the same penalties as. those for violating section
517.07 for violations of the antifraud provisions through nondisclo-
sure of material information.'
170. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1977) (repealed 1978).
171. Id. § 517.061(11)(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
172. Rule 3E-5.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,644.
173. The great expansion of federal antifraud liability has forced an entire class of ex-
empt issuers dealing in the municipal bond market to provide increasingly expanded disclo-
sure. See generally, Casey & Smith, A New Look at Municipal Bonds-Disclosure Responsi-
bilities in the Municipal Bond Market, 50 ST. Join's L. Rcv. 639 (1976). Florida law has kept
pace with, if not exceeded, the development of federal antifraud liability. It is likely, there-
fore, that the securities bar in Florida will encourage their clients to make disclosures which
are not required under the offering circular rules but which may be needed to avoid antifraud
liability. On rare occasions no disclosure may be necessary pursuant to the antifraud provi-
sions where there is a sale to blood relatives. See Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590, 593-94
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
174. FLA. STAT. § 517.211 (Supp. 1978). Beside aider and abettor liability, counsel for
the issuer may be liable as a principal if its representation of the issuer was disclosed. See
Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Or. 1971). Although Nova-Tech
has been severely criticized, the rationale of that case will present difficulties for attorneys if
it is adopted by Florida courts. Counsel for the issuer would be placed in a precarious position
due to the overlap between the Nova-Tech rule and rule 3E-5.06, 1 BLUE SKY L. Rap. (CCH)
13,646. Rule 5.06(C) provides that attorneys who advise purchasers must disclose any
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Second, the disclosure may still be required regardless of the
Florida exemption if the facilities of interstate commerce are used
in connection with the offering. When an issuer seeks to avoid regis-
tration at both the federal and state levels and relies upon the
federal private placement exemption in conjunction with the Flor-
ida exemption, delivery of offering circulars will generally be re-
quired." When the issuer relies upon the intrastate exemption or
rule 147, only the disclosure requirements of the federal antifraud
provisions will be imposed. 7 '
In light of the overlapping disclosure requirements of the state
and federal securities laws, it is common practice to determine the
most demanding of all standards relevant to a particular offering
and to comply with all of them in a single document. For example,
in an offering of less than $500,000, an issuer should distribute an
offering circular which meets the requirements of rule 146 to the six
or more Florida resident purchasers, assuming there are also nonres-
ident purchasers, subject to the few modifications in that document
required by Florida law. 7 In that way maximum protection from
antifraud liability under Florida law is provided at the least cost.
Where the issuer sells securities to more than five persons, it
must furnish all offerees with an offering circular containing full and
fair disclosure pursuant to section 517.061(11)(a)(1) of the Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1978). The new rules provide for a two-tiered sys-
tem of disclosure. According to the rules, only limited information
must be furnished if the offering involves $500,000 or less.' Disclo-
compensation they have received from the issuer and whether the fees were contingent upon
sales. For example, the law firm of X & Y represents issuer A in its private placement of
securities. The law firm agrees to perform its services to A for compensation based on the
number of subscriptions which A receives. B, one of X's clients, is a high-income investor
who asks X if he knows of any sound investments. Because X had great confidence in A's
abilities, he responds that A's offering seems to be rather attractive. Under these facts X
should disclose to B his fee arrangements with A. This disclosure should be documented and
memorialized in the offering circular. See Carney, The Perils of Rule 146, 8 U. TOL. L. REv.
343, 351 (1977). When the name of the firm is placed on the offering circular, however, the
partners would be exposed to liability as principals if the Nova-Tech doctrine applied.
175. Under the § 4(2) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933, courts will generally
require the actual delivery of disclosure information to the offeree. See Lawler v. Gilliam, 569
F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978). Under rule 146, delivery of disclosure information is necessary
unless the offeree possesses either an economic bargaining position or a family relationship
that provides him with access to all information which would be disclosed in a registration
statement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1978).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1978); Rule 3E-5.06(A), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,646.
177. The issuer only would be required to add to the rule 146 offering circular a clear
statement that the sale may be voided at the election of the purchaser within three days of
the making of a purchase and to provide a copy of the escrow agreement. FLA. STAT. §
517.061(11)(c), (e) (Supp. 1978).
178. Rule 3E-505(B), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,645.
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sure of most items found on Schedule A of the Securities Act of 1933
is required if the offering involves more than $500,000.'11 To deter-
mine whether an offering involves more than $500,000, both the
offering price and any recourse indebtedness assumed by the pur-
chasers should be included in the computation.' 80
Issuers relying on the small offering disclosure rules should con-
sider the costs of litigation attendant to the use of an abbreviated
document. Private parties suing the issuer may argue that courts
should not view this two-tiered system as satisfying the conditions
of the private placement exemption because the Department of
Banking and Finance failed to implement the full disclosure stan-
dard allowed by the statute.'8' Such an argument suffers from sev-
eral infirmities. First, the argument assumes that the marginal ben-
efits of increased disclosure, outweigh the social costs of decreased
economic activity within the State of Florida.'82 Second, the argu-
ment ignores the clear delegation to the Department of rulemaking
authority over disclosure standards.' 3 Since the Department has
fashioned its standards in accordance with the overall regulatory
philosophy of the Florida Securities Act, and it acts to promote a
healthy business environment, those standards should withstand
attacks made on the basis that higher levels of "investor protection"
would have been achieved by more costly and demanding disclosure
standards. 84 It was the Florida Legislature that favored an expand-
ing economy over the marginal social benefits of increased regula-
179. Id. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,645, discussed in Brown, The New Florida
Private Placement Exemption, in THE FLORIDA SEcUrIrIEs AcT, supra note 48, at 3.11.
180. Rule 3E-5.05(E), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,645. The rule specifically states
that nonrecourse indebtedness assumed by the purchasers will not be computed in determin-
ing the size of the offering. Id.
181. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
182. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra. If the costs of extensive disclosures were
imposed upon all offerings regardless of their size, many of the smaller offerings would not
be feasible. For the same reason, the SEC has established a higher standard of disclosure
under rule 146 for offerings exceeding $1.5 million and a lesser standard for smaller offerings.
SEC Release No. 33-5975, [1978 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,708 (Sept.
8, 1978).
183. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
184. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra. In order to create a healthy business
environment it was necessary to remove the restrictive burdens on the access of promotional
firms to sources of capital. See Casey, supra note 23, at 572-73. To adopt the nearly uniform
disclosure requirements which rule 146 had previously imposed would have provided large
firms with competitive advantages. Should Schedule A disclosures be required of all firms,
the larger firms would be the only ones able to place securities privately. "Reporting compa-
nies ordinarily can afford the costs of full registration. The economic burden of rule 146
disclosure thus falls most heavily on smaller issues. Newly formed companies will have the
highest proportional burden .... " Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe
Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 54 (1975).
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tion in these situations. That the benefits of such regulation would
be slight is attested to by the fact that the disclosures required by
Schedule A are generally not information deemed significant by
sophisticated investors in private placements. 5
d. Voidability of Sales
An exemption provides that all sales of privately placed securi-
ties are voidable by the purchaser within three days of the making
of a purchase.' 6 The power to void the sale must be clearly commu-
nicated to offerees in offering circulars. It appears that this informa-
tion must also be communicated in disclosure documents which are
gratuitously provided by the issuer as well as in those offering circu-
lars required by section 517.061(11)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1978).
e. Escrow Agreements
The private placement exemption does not apply to a transac-
tion in which an "offering seeks to or does receive subscription from
more than five persons,"' 87 unless the issuer complies with the statu-
tory requirements for the escrowing of invested funds. Although the
term "subscriptions" is not defined in the Florida Securities Act, it,
as well as the entire escrow requirement, was borrowed from the pre-
organization exemption of the Sale of Securities Law where its
meaning was clear.'I Whether an offering seeks to attract more than
five subscribers is problematic. It is not entirely clear whether the
intent of the promoters, a document purporting to be a plan of
offering or the minutes of organizing directors' meetings should be
the controlling evidence as to what was sought by an offering.
If an offering involves more than five subscribers, the issuer or
its agents must establish a bona fide escrow account with a bank, a
trust company or an attorney.88 The agreement must state the price
of the securities, the total number of securities which will be issued,
the minimum funds necessary to satisfy the terms of the offering
and the day on which the same will be concluded."10 A copy of this
185. "The kind of information that experienced investors demand and get in a private
placement is quite different than that normally found in a prospectus." Casey, supra note
23, at 576.
186. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(e) (Supp. 1978).
187. Id. § 517.061(11)(c) (emphasis added).
188. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(10) (1977) (repealed 1978).
189. Id. § 517.061(11)(c) (Supp. 1978).
190. The agreement must not provide that the offering may remain open for more than
six months. Id.
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agreement must be delivered to each subscriber before his funds are
accepted in order for the transaction to be deemed a private place-
ment. If the escrow agent collects at least the minimum funds stated
in the agreement, the agent must pay those funds to the organized
firm. Otherwise, the funds must be returned to the investors.
The escrow requirement is a vestige of the Sale of Securities
Law and burdens issuers without providing substantial correspond-
ing benefits to investors. The requirement is annoying to an issuer
contemplating sales to five or fewer persons who actually sells to a
greater number. "' In such cases, the issuer might not have estab-
lished an account or may have refrained from distributing copies of
the escrow agreement to offerees. When the decision to-sell to more
than five persons is made, the issuer then becomes responsible to
return all of the funds previously invested and begin the offering
process anew. Further criticism of the escrow requirement is based
upon its imposition of an arbitrary six-month limitation on offer-
ings. For these reasons the escrow requirement should have been
eliminated in the Florida Securities Act.
f. Advertising
The private placement exemption only extends -lo transactions
which involve no advertising or public solicitation. P1 Thus, neither
an issuer nor any person acting on the issuer's behalf may publish
any article, notice or other communication in printed media or
broadcast advertisement of an offering over radio or television. 9 3 If
such advertising is accomplished in another state where it is lawful,
the exempt status of the offering will not be affected."'
g. Legended Certificates
Issuers must imprint the documents evidencing securities with
a "restrictive legend" indicating that the security has not been reg-
istered under the Florida Securities Act.9 5 "Restrictive legend" is
not a defined term in the Florida Securities Act. The restrictive
legend device, however, has been utilized in connection with the
federal private placement exemption for many years. The purpose
191. See Brown, supra note 179, at 3.17.
192. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(a)(2) (Supp. 1978).
193. Rule 3E-5.07(B), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,647. Pictures are a form of adver-
tisement according to the rules of the Department of Banking and Finance. Rule 3E-2.01, 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,611.
194. See Rule 3E-5.07, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,647.
195. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(f) (Supp. 1978).
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of the legend is to ensure that a private placement of securities will
actually remain a nonpublic offering.' The restrictive legend now
required in Florida private placements is similar to those which
have commonly been used in securities practice under the federal
law." 7 A respected commentator, however, has argued that the leg-
end need only contain a statement that the securities have not been
registered under the Florida Securities Act."18
h. Improvements on Rule 146
Section 517.061(11) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) was
created after securities practitioners had gained practical experi-
ence with rule 146. Although the Florida exemption parallels the
SEC rule in many important respects, the section deviates from the
rule in a significant fashion.Both exemptions limit the number of ultimate purchasers in a
private placement to thirty-five. Both provide similar definitional
exemptions from the term "purchaser" so that when more than
thirty-five persons can participate in private placement under one
law, the other law probably will allow almost the same amount of
flexibility."' A common problem with these numerical limitations
lies in the vague'integration standards now common to the blue sky
and federal rules.210 To unravel the mystery of integration, counsel
will be forced to request interpretive letters from the SEC and to
petition the Division of Securities for a declaratory statement.
Another problem is that both rule 146 and the blue sky exemp-
tion permit the payment of compensation to offeree representatives
or evaluators, but neither the SEC nor the Department adequately
196. See 2 S. GOLDBERo, supra note 148, at 2-96.
197. A form of the legend which has been recommended for use in the offering of federal
private placements is as follows:
THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT
BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. THESE
SECURITIES MAY NOT BE OFFERED, SOLD, TRANSFERRED, PLEDGED
OR HYPOTHECATED IN THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION, OR THE
AVAILABILITY OF AN EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. FURTHERMORE, NO OFFER, SALE, TRANS-
FER, PLEDGE OR HYPOTHECATION IS TO TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE
PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL OF COUNSEL OF THE ISSUER BEING AF-
FIXED TO THIS CERTIFICATE ....
Id. at 2-97, -98.
198. Brown, supra note 179, at 3.17.
199. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2) (1978) with rule 3E-5.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) $ 13,644.
200. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (preliminary Note 3) (1978); rule 3E-5.01, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 13,641.
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protects those persons from inadvertently becoming broker-dealers
or investment advisers. 0' The SEC raised the problem in such a
vague manner that persons who assist the offeree cannot be certain
whether they will be deemed investment advisers or broker-dealers.
The business environment in Florida would be greatly improved by
the adoption of a statute or rule which protected these evaluators
from the requirement of a registration as a professional in the securi-
ties industry.
The most dramatic area in which the two standards for private
placements differ lies in the disclosure requirements. Under rule
146, issuers must deliver offering circulars to all offerees unless the
offerees have "access to the kinds of information a prospectus would
have provided."2"2 Problems exist for the issuer under rule 146
whether he relies on access or delivery to satisfy the disclosure re-
quirement.
While the elements of access are uncertain, it is commonly
believed that the courts and the SEC will not find "access" unless
there is a special relationship between the issuer and the investors
or the investors have close ties to the officers of a firm.2"3 The access
exception to the offering circular requirement of rule 146 is thus a
trap for the unwary. Furthermore, there are significant legal expen-
ses associated with supplying access, so little is 'ained by relying
on the access provisions.20'
A problem exists with delivery of disclosure information under
rule 146 as to the type and extent of disclosure required. The rule
201. The suggestion is made by the SEC that: "Persons acting as offeree representatives
should consider the applicability of the registration and anti-fraud provisions relating to
brokers and dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and relating to investment
advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1) (Note 1)
(1978). One commentator has attempted to alert offeree representatives to the fact that
Florida's registration requirements may apply as well. Brown, supra note 179, at 3.15.
202. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1978). Access is defined as follows: "Access can only exist
by reason of the offeree's position with respect to the issuer. Position means an employment
or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain infor-
mation from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective invest-
ment." Id. § 203.146(e) (Note). The courts have come to overlay the judicial construction of
§ 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 with both an access and delivery requirement. See, e.g.,
Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978).
203. See SEC Release No. 33-5487, 1 FFD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
At one point in time the SEC espoused the view that access existed only where the offerees'
relationship to the issuer approximated that of an insider's. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco
Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
204. In a recent article a commentator has indicated that the legal expenses associated
with supplying offerees with access to relevant information involved at least $10,000 to
$20,000. See Campbell, supra note 27, at 1146. He concluded that "[t]he cost of supplying
access may well be prohibitive.;' Id.
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provides that an offeree must be furnished with a document con-
taining all the information which would have been included in a
registration statement unless the issuer is a reporting company
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2o5 Much of that informa-
tion, however, is generally considered worthless by sophisticated
investors. ' Yet a failure to disclose complete information on any
particular item provides an excuse for investors to rescind the trans-
action. 0
The Florida exemption alleviates these problems. First, the
type of access implicitly involved in the Florida Securities Act is
based upon the notion of reasonable access. 08 Second, the regula-
tory scheme permits issuers to provide those disclosures which are
desired by the investors without burdening them with excess costs,
unless there are more than six purchasers investing more than
$500,000. In the latter situation the offering circular requirements
resemble those of Schedule A of the Securities Act of 1933.209 If the
Department and the courts do not demand the same precision in full
disclosure as under the federal standard then "the sword of
recission-by-technicality from man-to-man dealings between small
groups"10 will have been lifted from the necks of issuers seeking
private investors.
The Florida exemption improves rule 146 since there is no suit-
ability requirement for offerees. They need be neither sophisticated
nor financially able to bear the risk of the investment. Most of the
voluminous criticism of SEC rule 146 has centered upon the prob-
lems created by its suitability requirements."'
205. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1978).
206. "The registration process was not designed to provide the kind of information
needed to evaluate new ventures and unseasoned businesses. . . .The kind of information
that experienced investors demand and get in a private placement is quite different than that
normally found in a prospectus." Casey, supra note 23, at 576.
207. For an analytical comparison of the standards determining whether violations of the
registration or antifraud provisions have occurred, see Note, The Defective Private Offering:
A Comparison of Purchasers' Remedies, 62 IowA L. Rav. 236 (1976).
208. See, e.g., Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590, 593-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
209. "[O]nly a summary of the Schedule A items was used in an attempt to provide a
less intricately structured system of formal disclosure." Brown, supra note 179, at 3.11. By
changing the formal system of disclosure, however, the Division has deprived attorneys of the
measure of certainty which had come to surround the formulation of disclosures under Sched-
ule A. The Division should thus not insist upon anything more than a competent attempt at
compliance.
210. Casey, supra note 23, at 593. The need for certainty in the requirements of the
exemption is crucial if issuers are to continue to seek to raise capital in reliance upon it. See
SEC Release No. 33-5336, [1972-73 TRANSFER BINDER] FED SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,108, at
82, 396-97 (Nov. 28, 1972).
211. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 174, at 352-77, passim; Hevmann, Is SEC Rule 146
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2. ISOLATED SALES
The new private placement exemption restricts the secondary
trading of the securities sold."' An opinion of counsel in the form of
a restrictive legend stating that the proposed transfer will not vio-
late the Florida Securities Act may be a prerequisite to such a
transaction.' Unless the securities are registered by the issuer at
the time of resale, counsel must find an applicable secondary trad-
ing exemption in order safely to aid his client. The Florida Securi-
ties Act, however, provides few such exemptions. The securities of
most small unlisted companies must be sold pursuant to the iso-
lated sale exemption unless they are registered.' This exemption
must have a broad sweep in order for the private placement mecha-
nism to be effectively employed.2t 5
Under both prior and current law, isolated sales of the securities
of a seller not the issuer or the underwriter thereof are exempt if the
sale is not made pursuant to a scheme to violate chapter 517 of the
Florida Statutes."' There had been little judicial interpretation of
the isolated sale exemption under the Sale of Securities Law.' 7 The
Too Subjective to Provide the Needed Predictability in Private Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REv.
1, 12-17 (1975); Kessler, supra note 184, at 51-54, 63-68.
212. See text accompanying notes 195-198 supra. "Restricted "edurities" are securities
upon which restrictions on transferability have been imposed. Securities which are privately
placed under the Florida Securities Act constitute one variety of restricted securities. Thus,
the documents evidencing such securities must be imprinted with a restrictive legend pur-
suant to FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(f) (Supp. 1978).
213. See note 197 supra.
214. The Florida Securities Act provides several exemptions for secondary trading in
securities. First, securities listed on major exchanges or securities of firms registered under §
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976), are exempt if sold at
the market price through a registered Florida dealer. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(18) (Supp. 1978).
This exemption, however, is limited to sales by other than controlling persons. Second, an
exemption is provided for resales of securities issued in connection with certain transactions
in property. Id. § 517.061(2). The scope of this exemption is extremely narrow. See text
accompanying notes 271-279 infra. Third, a resale of securities not exempted under the first
two exemptions may be sold absent registration only if they are sold pursuant to the isolated
sale exemption. Id. § 517.061(3).
215. When the resale provisions are too burdensome, as are the conditions of SEC rule
144, the private placement mechanism will be viewed as unattractive due to the increased
pressure for control from investors. See Casey, supra note 23, at 577.
216. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(3) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.061(3) (Supp. 1978)).
217. There was no opinion which carefully described the requirements of the exemption.
See [1957-58] FLA. A'rr'Y GEN. BmNNLL REP. 77,78 [hereinafter cited as ATrORNEY GEN.
Op.]. Out of the three cases interpreting the exemption, two concern the elements of a sale
by an "issurer or underwriter," Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590, 592 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978);
Dokken v. Minnesota-Ohio Oil Corp., 232 So. 2d 200, 203-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), and the
third analyzes whether a particular transaction was conducted for the benefit of an issuer.
Cain v. Solomon, 213 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
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Attorney General attempted to fill the void by borrowing from the
case law of states with a similar exemption."' A dichotomy was thus
established between isolated and repeated sales. Successive, recur-
ring or repeated sales were dispositions pursuant to a single plan,
while isolated sales were considered haphazard events prompted by
unrelated circumstances:
The act explicitly permits an owner to make more than a single
sale of his stock, and he may safely dispose of it piecemeal on
occasion, for profit, from convenience or other legitimate motive.
But where the sales by an unregistered owner, though detached
and separate, recur within such reasonable time as to indicate an
association of acts under one general purpose, such sales are not
'isolated' ....119
The Attorney General noted that the length of time between sales
would be a significant factor in many cases, but he also stated that
such variables as the value of the securities and the number of
shares sold were of equal importance."2 ' Thus, there was no clear
method for bringing sales within the exemption.
Confusion also existed as to the class of persons who could rely
upon the exemption. The exemption specifically denied protection
to issuers and underwriters. Problems arose because the meaning of
those terms was unclear. The term "issuer" included all promoters
of the issuer but no definition of "promoter" was provided in the
Sale of Securities Law or the regulations thereunder.22'
218. ATrORNEY GEN. op., supra note 217, at 77-78 (citing Kneeland v. Emerton, 280
Mass. 37, 183 N.E. 155 (1932); Silvertooth v. Kelly, 162 Or. 381, 91 P.2d 1112 (1939); Com-
monwealth v. Summons, 41 A.2d 697,699 (Pa. 1945); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Comm.,
209 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 1949).
219. Id. at 77 (quoting Commonwealth v. Summons, 41 A.2d 697, 699 (Pa. 1945).
220. Id. at 77-78.
221. FLA. STAT. § 517.02(5) (1977) (current version at id. § 517.021(a) (Supp. 1978)). The
range of possible definitions was large. One construction might have been the definition
chosen by the SEC:
The term "promoter" includes:
(1) Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more other
persons, directly or indirectly takes initiative in founding and organizing the
business or enterprise of an issuer;
(2) Any person who, in connection with the founding and organizing of the
business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives in consideration
of services or property, or both services and property, 10 percent or more of any
class of securities of the issuer or 10 percent or more of the proceeds from the sale
of any class of securities. However, a person who receives such securities or pro-
ceeds either solely as underwriting commissions or solely in consideration of prop-
erty shall not be deemed a promoter within the meaning of this paragraph if such
person does not otherwise take part in founding and organizing the enterprise.
SEC rule 405(q), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(q) (1978). According to this definition, an attorney who
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During the survey period the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance has promulgated regulations which explain the operation of
the isolated sales exemption. These rules define the class of persons
who will be permitted to use the exemption and the characteristics
of transactions which will be deemed isolated sales. Through the
definition of major terms, the rules harmonize with the legislative
overhaul of this exemption.
Section 517.021(16) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) pro-
vides a new definition of "underwriter." Persons who will not be
permitted to rely on the isolated sales exemption are those who: (1)
purchase from an issuer or an affiliate of the issuer with a view to
distribution; (2) sell or offer to sell securities on behalf of an issuer
or an affiliate; and (3) participate directly or indirectly in any such
undertaking.22 The statute, however, specifically provides that a
had received 11% of the stock for his services in the organization of a firm might be deemed
a promoter even though he became a passive investor in later years.
222. FLA. STAT. § 517.021(16) (Supp. 1978). The term issuer continues to mean "any
person who proposed to issue, has issued, or shall hereafter issue any security . . . [and]
any person who acts as a promoter." Id. § 517.021(9). The term promoter is defined, for the
first time in the Florida blue sky laws, as:
(a) Any person who, acting along or in conjunction with one or more other
persons, directly or indirectly initiates the founding or organizing of the business
or enterprise of an issuer; or
(b) Any person who, in connection with the founding and organizing of the
business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives in consideration
of services, or a combination of services and property, ten percent (10%) or more
of any class of securities of the issuer or ten percent (10%) or more of the proceeds
from the sale of any class of securities of the issuer; provided that any person who
receives securities or proceeds from the sale of securities either solely as under-
writing commissions or solely in consideration of property shall not be deemed a
promoter if such person does not otherwise take part in founding and organizing
the enterprise of the issuer.
Rule 3E-2.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,612. Under the new regulatory scheme, there-
fore, the persons who will be deemed issuers are those actual or would-be issuers of securities
and those persons who have within one year participated in organizing the enterprise. Persons
selling securities on behalf of such persons are underwriters and may not rely upon the
isolated sale exemption. Rule 3E-5.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,642.
Underwriters may also be those persons who deal with affiliates of the issuer. "Affiliates"
include those persons who "directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, con-
trols, is controlled by, or is under common control with [an issuer]." FLA. STAT. § 517.021(1)
(Supp. 1978). Control is defined in the following manner: "'Control,' including the terms
'controlling,' 'controlled by,' and 'under common control with,' means the possession, directly
or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." Id. §
517.021(5). Thus, underwriters are the persons who purchase, sell, or otherwise participate
in a distribution by or for a person: (1) who can direct the management of the issue; (2) whose
management is directed by the issuer; or (3) whose management is subject to the direction
of a person who is also able to direct the management of the issuer. If one purchases securities
from these persons, he will not be permitted to resell through reliance upon the isolated sale
exemption unless rule 3E-5.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,642, applies.
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person who has beneficially owned stock for one year will not. be
deemed an underwriter.2 Tacking of holding periods will be permit-
ted where the holder acquired his security upon conversion when he
has paid no additional consideration for the security. Furthermore,
dealers will not be deemed underwriters of securities other than part
of an unsold allotment to or subscription by the dealer acting as a
participant in a distribution.
New rule 3E-5.02n4 provides a nonexclusive definition of iso-
lated sales made by or on behalf of persons other than issuers or
underwriters. A transaction will be deemed an isolated sale within
section 517.061(3) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) if it satisfies
the requirements of either SEC rule 144 or 237 as those rules were
in effect on November 1, 1978. Furthermore, transactions by nonis-
suers which conform to the criteria elaborated in the private place-
ment exemption provided in sections 517.061(11)(a) and (b) of the
Florida Statutes will be considered isolated sales.
SEC rule 144 implements the exemption from registration for
certain secondary transactions provided by section 4(1) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.225 The rule defines the circumstances under
which a person will not be deemed an underwriter of securities and
thus able to sell without registration. Conditions are imposed upon:
(1) the amount of securities which may be sold; (2) the manner of
sale; (3) the availability of current public information concerning
the issuer; and (4) the holding period of the seller of the securities."'
Once every three months, and subject to certain qualifications, sales
may be made of the greater of one percent of the total outstanding
class of securities or the average weekly trading volume of that class
of the issuer's securities for the four weeks preceeding the sale. A
detailed analysis of rule 144 is beyond the scope of this article and
has been adequately presented elsewhere.2"
223. FLA. STAT. § 517.021(16) (Supp. 1978). Furthermore, the rules clearly state that
promoters and affiliates of the issuer will not be deemed underwriters of securities which they
have beneficially owned for at least one year. Rule 3E-5.02(B), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
13,642.
224. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,642.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978), as amended by SEC Release No. 33-5979, [1978
TRANsFER BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,731 (Sept. 19, 1978).
227. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 148; D. GoLDwAsSER, A GumE To RULE 144 (2d ed.
1978); NoRTHwEsTERN UNtvsrrY SCHOOL OF LAw, A GUIDE TO SECURrrEs AND EXCHANGE RULE
144 (1973); Adarbaum, Fleisher, Leiman & Schmults, Problems Under Rule 144, in PLI
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTfrUTE ON SEcuRrrs REGULATION (19??); Bloomenthal, Rule 144, the SEC,
and Restricted Securities, 49 DEN. L.J. 301 (1973); Casey, supra note 23; Elner, Rule 144,
The New Limitations on Restricted and Control Stock Sales, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 251; Green,
Selling Securities Under Rule 144-A Practical Guide, 18 PRAc. LAw. 13 (May 1972); Kapp
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An important question of interpretation arises as to whether the
SEC's administrative gloss on rule 144 will control the interpreta-
tion of rule 3E-5.02. 2 1 An analysis of the purpose and function of
such pronouncements leads to the conclusion that sellers relying on
rule 3E-5.02, disgruntled purchasers and the Department should not
be bound by SEC no-action letters. No-action letters and other
interpretative rulings are not binding on the SEC since they are not
considered formal acts of the Commission.22 Ordinarily, they may
not be reviewed by a court absent interested parties other than the
party seeking the administrative ruling.2 3 Thus, commentators
have criticized many of these releases as exercises of bureaucratic
trial ballooning.2'
An alternative exists to the wholesale incorporation of the infor-
mal opinions of the SEC into the isolated sales exemption via rule
3E-5.02. Rule 3E-5.02 should be interpreted to adopt rule 144 as
promulgated through the formal rulemaking procedures as of Nov-
ember 1, 1978. The scope and application of rule 3E-5.02 can then
& Bancroft, Beyond Form 144: A Sampler of Rule 144 Documents, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 152
(1973); Linden, Resale of Restricted and Control Securities Under SEC Rule 144: The First
Five Years, 8 SETON HALL L. REv. 159 (1977); Lipton, Fogelson & Warnken, Rule 144-A
Summary Review After Two Years, 29 Bus. LAW. 1183 (1974); Miller, Venture Capital:
Technique for Increasing Liquidity With a View Toward Rule 144, 29 Bus. LAw. 461 (1974);
Shapiro, Checklist for the Seller's Counsel: Rule 144, 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 60 (1973); Wheat,
Developments in Private Placements, Distributions of Restricted Securities, 28 Bus. LAW.
483 (1973); Comment, Shareholders After Merger: What They Can and Cannot Do Under
SEC Rules 144 and 145, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 70 (1973); Comment, SEC Rule 144:
The Development of Objective Standards in the Administrative Process, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 403
(1972); Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private Placements for the Few, 59 VA. L. REv. 886
(1973); Note, Resale of Restricted Securities Under SEC Rule 144, 81 YALE L.J. 1574 (1972).
228. The staff of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC has informally inter-
preted the provisions of rule 144 in both no-action letters and other interpretive releases. For
a recent discussion of some of these pronouncements, see Barron, Control and Restricted
Securities, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 261 (1978).
229. The Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC stated:
The Division acts in an advisory capacity to the Commission, and recommen-
dations of the Division may or may not be accepted by the Commission. A "no-
action" letter merely represents the recommendation the Division would make to
the Commission on the basis of the facts presented; it is not a formal administra-
tive act of the Commission.
Letter from Chief Counsel, SEC Division of Corporation Finance, to Harry Balterman, Esq.
(Apr. 12, 1965), reprinted in 1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 134.10 (quoted in Kanton v. United
States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D. N.J. 1965)). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note
63, at 1895.
230. Compare Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) with Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of the EPA,
556 F.2d 1282, 1290 nn.8 & 9 (5th Cir. 1977).
231. See, e.g., Lowenfels, SEC "No-action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested
Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1256, 1266-69 (1971).
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be defined by the Department through the administrative proce-
dures of Florida law. These procedures are preferable to the no-
action process because petitioners for declaratory statements have
an absolute right to a reply. 32 Furthermore, such statements are
deemed final orders of the agency and are thus subject to judicial
review.m Florida's administrative procedures provide a framework
which requires a careful construction of the parameters of the ex-
emption.
A seller can rely on the isolated sale exemption if he satisfies
the requirements of sections 517.061(11)(a) and (b) of the Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1978).24 The seller, therefore, will be required to
furnish an offering circular containing full and fair disclosure if he
sells to more than five persons in any consecutive twelve-month
period.m Because of this requirement, it is assumed that sellers will
generally limit their sales to five or fewer persons. The seller or those
acting in his behalf must refrain from public solicitation and adver-
tising and must not pay a commission or other remuneration to
anyone other than a registered Florida securities dealer.
Some confusion may arise as to whether the rules promulgated
under the private placement exemption apply regardless of the fact
that the seller is not an issuer of the securities. 20 The rules relating
to integration of purchasers, offering circular requirements and ad-
vertising are not by their terms limited in application to the acts of
issuers.2' Because the Department fashioned those rules at the same
time as the rule implementing the isolated sale exemption, an inte-
grated approach to the rules is appropriate. The rule regarding com-
pensation, however, specifically applies to sales by issuers.28 Be-
cause sellers may wish to avail themselves of attorneys' and accoun-
tants' services this rule should be amended, or another promul-
gated, so as to include within the exemption sellers other than is-
suers.
232. FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1977). The SEC, however, cannot be compelled to respond to
a request for a no-action letter. See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
233. FLA. STAT. § 120.565, .68 (1977). For a comprehensive discussion of judicial review
of administrative decisions in Florida, see Swan, Administrative Adjudication of Constitu-
tional Questions: Confusion in Florida Law and a Dying Misconception in Federal Law, 33
U. Muhn L. REv. 527 (1979).
234. Rule 3E-5.02(A)(i), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,642. The provisions of the
private placement exemption, FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11) (Supp. 1978), have been discussed in
detail above. See text accompanying notes 147 - 211 8upra.
235. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(11)(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
236. Issuers cannot rely on the isolated sale exemption. Id. § 517.061(3); Brown v. Rai-
righ, 363 So. 2d 590, n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
237. Rule 3E-5.01, .04, .05 & .07, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,641, 13, 644-45,13,647.
238. Rule 3E-5.06, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,646.
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3. THE DEALER'S EXEMPTION FOR ISOLATED SALES
Sales by dealers who effected sale of stock for secondary traders
relying upon rule 144 are exempted from registration by section 4(4)
of the Securities Act of 1933 as implemented by rule 144(g).2 39 Ac-
cording to rule 144(g), brokers who neither solicit on behalf of the
customer nor receive more than the customary broker's commission
need not register the securities they sell as agents pursuant to rule
144. The Sale of Securities Law contained a provision which some-
what resembled section 4(4).40 This exemption was criticized be-
cause its application to isolated sales was uncertain.2"' When this
exemption was carried verbatim into the Florida Securities Act, a
commentator called for a clarifying rule that would provide an ex-
emption for dealers in keeping with the new rules for isolated
sales."'
Rule 3E-5.08 41 accomplishes most of the objectives sought by
the Bar. The rule establishes that all sales in transactions conform-
ing to rule 144 as it existed on November 1, 1978 will be deemed an
unsolicited purchase or sale of securities on order of and as agent
for another pursuant to section 517.061(13) of the Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1978). This rule reaffirms the position taken in rule 3E-5.02
that promoters or affiliates of an issuer, or participants in a distribu-
tion for the issuer, will not be deemed underwriters with respect to
those securities which they have beneficially owned for at least one
year.244
4. FEDERALLY REGISTERED OFFERINGS
The Florida Securities Act provides an exemption from regis-
tration in Florida for the sale of securities pursuant to a registration
statement which has become effective under the Securities Act of
1933.249 Under the Sale of Securities Law, registration had been
required for offerings by issuers or other sellers of securities even if
the securities were registered under federal law.2 46 Now, issuers,
dealers and other sellers of securities can entirely avoid merit scru-
239. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1976), defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(g) (1978).
240. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(14) (1977) (repealed 1978).
241. Leisner, Exempt Securities and Exempt Transactions Under New Chapter 517, in
THE FLORIDA SEcumrriEs Acr, supra note 47, at 4.13.
242. Id. (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 517.061(13) (Supp. 1978)).
243. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,648.
244. Compare id. with rule 3E-5.02(B), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,642.
245. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(19) (Supp. 1978).
246. Id. §§ 517.08, .091 (1977) (repealed 1978) (coordination and announcement proce-
dures), discussed at text accompanying notes 109-113 supra.
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tiny of the securities by registering their offering with the SEC.
Reliance upon this exemption is conditioned upon four factors.
First, the seller must execute and deliver to the Department of
Banking and Finance a notice of intention to sell which contains the
names and addresses of the seller and issuer and the title of the
securities.24 Second, a copy of the initial registration statement and
the prospectus filed with the SEC must be sent to the Department.
The Department also requires amendments arising through SEC
staff comments to be filed with the Division of Securities. Third, a
nonreturnable filing fee of one percent of the aggregate sales price
of not less than $25 nor more than $750 and an irrevocable consent
to service must accompany the prospectus.248 Fourth, all other infor-
mation which the Department may require by rule must be pro-
vided by the seller.
This new exemption furthers the major legislative policies un-
derlying the Florida Securities Act. Costs to issuers, underwriters
and investors will be reduced by removing wasteful and duplicative
regulatory burdens. Thus, more capital will be available for invest-
ment in the production of useful products. Furthermore, the exemp-
tion will greatly contract the scope of merit regulation.4
According to a literal interpretation of the statute, only sales,
and not offers, are exempt. This problem arises because the earliest
time at which sales of securities are permitted under the Securities
Act of 1933 is when the registration statement becomes effective.
Hence, the phrase "sales pursuant to an effective registration state-
ment" is a term of art under the federal securities laws. The new
exemption under the Florida Securities Act will lose its usefulness,
however, if offers and sales are not exempt even after notice is filed
with the Department. The courts, therefore, should interpret this
provision in a manner consistent with the legislative purpose under-
lying the exemption.
Even so, the scope of the new exemption is too narrow. Al-
though section 517.061(19) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) will
provide relief in the case of large offerings, the welfare of smaller
issuers has not been improved. Because the fixed costs of registered
offerings under the Securities Act of 1933 have disproportionately
adverse effects on small offerings, large firms gained an unfair com-
petitive advantage over small firms with the enactment of the Flor-
ida Securities Acts. This disparity can be remedied under state law
247. Id. § 617.061(19) (Supp. 1978).
248. Id. §§ 517.061(19)(c), .101; Rule 3E-5.09, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,649.
249. See text accompanying notes 14-28 supra.
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as it has been remedied in the federal system.
Regulation A of the SEC has established streamlined proce-
dures for small offerings without sacrificing the important elements
of disclosure.2 If an offering involves $1.5 million or less the issuer
may file a Form 1-A with a Regional Office of the SEC.151 Although
the issuer must amend his original form in accordance with the
staff's comments and must wait until the Commission, in effect,
makes the Regulation A filing effective by determining that the
small offering exemption is applicable, the process is generally be-
lieved to be quicker and less expensive than the ordinary registra-
tion process.212 Because the financial statement required in a Form
1-A need not be certified, large savings in accountants' fees are
realized." Similarly, costs are reduced because both the filings with
the Regional Offices and the offering circulars distributed to pur-
chasers may be typewritten rather than printed.2 4 The fact that
small issuers depend upon Regulation A should be considered by the
Florida Legislature.
If section 517.061(19) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) is
expanded to exempt Regulation A offerings from registration in
Florida, the gross disparity between the treatment of large and
small issuers would be corrected. The public would benefit from
such a legislative amendment because they would receive almost as
much disclosure but at reduced cost. Nor would Florida be the first
to extend an exemption for registered securities to Regulation A
offerings. Rather, it would be joining most of the other states which
presently provide exemptions for federally registered securities.2 55
Because of the blue sky exemption, issuers in those states have
considered Regulation A to be a meaningful alternative to registra-
tion.26
250. Regulation A is a series of rules promulgated by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263
(1978), which implement the exemption provided by § 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976). This exemption is the only one which is not self-determinable by an
offeror and which requires prior notice to and the acquiescance of the SEC. Glavin & Purcell,
Securities Offerings and Regulation A-Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAw, 303, 304
(1958).
251. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.254..255 (1978); SEC Release No. 33-5977, [1978 TRANsFER
BINDER] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,710 (Sept. 11, 1978).
252. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 63, at 611; Burge, Regulation A: A Review and a Look at
Recent Developments, 46 L.A.B. BuLL. 290, 294 & 310 (1971); Cole, An Introduction to
Regulation A: Small Business Financing Exemption, 56 CHI. B. REc. 34, 40 (1974).
253. Weisse Regulation A Under the Securities Act of 1933-Highways and Byways, 8
N.Y.L.F. 3, 80 (1962).
254. Id. at 51, 98.
255. GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(e) (1976); Na'. Rxv. STAT. § 90.075 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:3-60 (1970); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-ff(5)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
256. Cole, supra note 252, at 36. The major obstacle to the use of Regulation A in the
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5. SALES BY DEALERS AT THE MARKET PRICE
Under the Sale of Securities Law there existed a transactional
exemption for two types of sales by registered dealers selling as
principals or agents at or near the market price.257 First, dealers
selling the securities of a reporting company under section 12(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934255 were exempt as long as the
issuer was current in meeting its reporting requirements. Second,
the exemption extended to sales of securities of a firm whose finan-
cial statements had recently been published in reports by either
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. or Standard and Poor's Corp. 5'
These exemptions were not applicable to sales by issuers, control-
ling persons or dealers disposing of all or part of their unsold allot-
ment as underwriters.
Section 517.05(6) of the Florida Statutes (1977) provided that
securities listed on any exchange in a large city were exempt securi-
ties. This exemption applied to sales by issuers, underwriters and
controlling persons. Because certain local exchanges did not require
registration or disclosure of any kind, it was possible for issuers to
publicly offer their securities for sale on an intrastate basis. These
sales could be made without registration under federal or Florida
law, because the distribution was made through a securities ex-
change.
The Florida Securities Act modifies the exemption for exchange
listed securities and the exemption for securities described in pub-
lished financial reports in section 517.061(18) (a) of the Florida Stat-
utes (Supp. 1978). Section 517.06(18)(a)(2) provides that sales of
securities issued by companies listed on national exchanges will be
exempt if all senior securities, evidences of indebtedness and sub-
scription rights issued by the firm are also listed.260 In other words,
sales of securities of companies registered pursuant to section 12(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are exempt if all of the
issuer's securities are listed. Because the exemption does not apply
to sales for the direct or indirect benefit of issuers and controlling
past has been the absence of blue sky coordination. See also Campbell, supra note 27, at 1141.
257. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(16) (1977) (repealed 1978).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 771(g) (1976).
259. Rule 3E-20.21, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,689(A).
260. The following national exchanges are registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission: American Stock Exchange; Boston Stock Exchange; Chicago Board of Trade;
Cinncinnati Stock Exchange; Detroit Stock Exchange; Midwest Stock Exchange (Chicago);
National Stock Exchange (New York); New York Stock Exchange; Pacific Stock Exchange;
Philadelphia Stock Exchange; Pittsburgh Stock Exchange; Salt Lake Stock Exchange; and
Spokane Stock Exchange. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 861.
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persons, there now exists only a secondary trading exemption. Fur-
thermore, since the securities of firms listed on a national exchange
must be registered under the Securities Act of 1934, the potential
for abuse has been eliminated.
Section 517.061(18)(c) provides the Department of Banking
and Finance with authority to deny the exemption with reference
to any particular security by order published in a manner deemed
proper by the Department. This portion of the statute may be con-
stitutionally infirm in several respects. First, the grant of absolute
power to deny the exemption with regard to any particular security
may constitute an unconstitutional grant of legislative authority to
an agency. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the statute
does not provide any criteria to guide the agency in its exercise of
the power. Thus, the grant is potentially one of unbridled discretion.
The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly held that the
legislature must incorporate guidelines into every statutory grant of
administrative authority."' In Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 2 the
authority of the Department to release bank records to public media
was stricken as unconstitutional because there were "no restric-
tions, limitations, or guidelines provided in the statute to limit or
regulate the action of the department in granting [or] withholding
consent to the news media inspecting, copying and publishing any
information in a bank's records." ' 3 Because section 517.061(18)(c)
provides no guidelines which the Department should apply in ruling
on the exemption, the Department would be acting within the grant
no matter what its reason for denial. Such a grant seems too
broad."' The power to terminate effectively the secondary market
261. See, e.g., Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, 367 So. 2d 219 (Fla.
1979); Harrington & Co. v. Tampa Port Auth., 358 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1978); High Ridge Mgt.
Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1977).
262. 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1977), discussed in Baena & Romanchuck, supra note 129, at
774-75.
263. 346 So. 2d at 55. The court went on to state:
The legal principal guiding the Circuit Judge in this case and which is dispo-
sitive of the issue under consideration is so well known as to be deemed
"hornbook" law. This Court had held in a long and unvaried line of cases that
statutes granting power to administrative agencies must clearly announce ade-
quate standards to guide the agencies in the execution of the powers delegated.
The statute must so clearly define the power delegated that the administrative
agency is precluded from acting through whim, showing favoritism, or exercising
unbridled discretion.
Id. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
264. For a comparison of a valid and an invalid delegation in statutes regulating the
same subject matter, see Flesch v. Metropolitan Dade County, 240 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA
1970).
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in an issuer's securities should not be granted without limitation.'
The Florida Legislature should amend this statute and impose stan-
dards and limitations upon the agency.
Supporters of the legislation might argue that the avowed pur-
pose of the legislation, whether it be to prevent fraud or to protect
orderly markets, should be sufficient to overcome a constitutional
challenge. In the words of the supreme court, however: "No matter
how laudable a piece of legislation may be in the minds of its spon-
sors, objective guidelines and standards should appear expressly in
the act or be within the realm of reasonable inference from the
language of the act where a delegation of power is involved." '6 The
nondelegation doctrine acts to protect a constitutional right and,
therefore, cannot be set aside on the strength of policy considera-
tions.
A second potential constitutional infirmity inherent in section
517.061(18)(c) is its failure to require a type of notice reasonably
calculated to ensure an opportunity to be heard."7 Publication of an
order in a manner deemed proper by the D.epartment may not al-
ways satisfy that standard. For example, suppose that the Depart-
ment publishes an order in the Florida Administrative Weekly de-
nying an exemption previously extended to the securities of X Cor-
poration. Whether or not the publication in the Florida Administra-
tive Weekly would constitute proper notice to shareholders as poten-
tial secondary traders,6 8 such notice would not be proper as against
265. No suggestion is made that the Department is predisposed to wield § 517.061(18)(c)
as a weapon to coerce certain behavior from issuers. Still, the legislature should act within
its constitutional constraints.
266. Smith v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968), quoted in High Ridge Mgt. Corp.
v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1977).
267. Administrative agencies must act in a manner which comports with procedural due
process. See, e.g., State Road Dep't v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 207 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla.
1st DCA 1968); Florida Beach Orchards, Inc. v. State, 190 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
Thus, the notice of an order by an agency must guarantee an adequate opportunity for a
hearing prior to action upon the order by the agency. See Wilson v. Pest Control Comm., 199
So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
268. The type of periodical in which notice is published must be one which a shareholder
and potential secondary trader might read, although it need not be a trade publication. See
Culclasure v. Consolidated Bond & Mfg. Co., 94 Fla. 764, 114 So. 540 (1927). The Department
recognizes that publication in the Florida Administrative Weekly will not always provide
adequate notice:
Service and notice of initial pleadings and orders and notices shall be effected
upon members of the general public by publication in the Florida Administrative
Weekly. The department may require any applicant to publish additional notices
in newspapers of general circulation in the area affected, or to give notice by mail,
as may be deemed reasonably necessary by the department to afford adequate
notice.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 3-3.12(1)(b) (1975).
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the issuer, whose address would be prominently featured upon all
disclosure documents required by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. It is suggested that prior to undertaking any action which
affects the substantial rights of any party the Division of Securities
must provide the best notice practicable despite the lax standard
of section 517.061(18)(c).
Even if the statute is held to be constitutional, the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") imposes certain require-
ments which must be met prior to the making of orders based upon
section 517.061(18)(c). Orders may only be made according to rules
adopted pursuant to the procedures provided for in the APA.2" Be-
cause no standards have been articulated in section 517.061(18)(c),
the content of the rule is currently indeterminable. 70
6. DEBTS SECURED BY REAL PROPERTY
The Sale of Securities Law contained exemptions for certain
transactions in real property.' These exemptions provided a basis
for certain practices which were labelled the "14% racket.", 2 The
Comptroller undertook a statewide investigation of the "mammoth
securities and mortgage fraud," '73 which culminated in numerous
trials beginning in 1975. The 1976 House Select Committee on
Mortgage Frauds proposed, and the legislature adopted, amend-
ments to the Mortgage Brokerage Act2 ' and the Florida Uniform
Land Sales Practices Law75 which effectively terminated the prac-
tices involved in the fourteen percent racket.275 The Florida Legisla-
ture completed this reform by eliminating the exemption from blue
sky registration.
269. See State v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). But see McDonald
v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (when governing rules
are in existence, additional statements of policy can be set forth in final orders without
violating rulemaking procedures). Substantially affected persons can petition the Depart-
ment to make rules implementing § 517.061(18)(c). FtA. Ar Nm. CODE § 3-501 (1975). Denial
of this petition can be appealed. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1977).
270. Should rules be adopted pursuant to § 517.061(18)(c), they could immediately be
attacked by a substantially affected person at an administrative level as an unconstitutional
delegation. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(a) (1977); FLA. ADMIN. CODE 3-6.01 to .03 (1975). Such a
person might alternatively bring an action for a declaratory judgment based upon the uncon-
stitutional delegation in a circuit court. FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011-.111 (1977).
271. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.06(7)-(8) (1977) (repealed 1978).
272. REPORT, supra note 122, at 6.
273. State ex ret. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 322 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla.
1975).
274. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-397 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 494.01-.11 (1977)).
275. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-262 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 478.011-.34 (1977)).
276. REPORT, supra note 122, at 6.
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The exemption in the Florida Securities Act for notes secured
by mortgages is narrow. The exemption extends only to notes or
bonds issued by a purchaser to a seller to'finance an acquisition of
real property or a renewal of the obligation when the debt is secured
by all or part of the property. 7 "Renewals" is a term of art defined
as the issuance of additional debt by the landowner if secured by
the real property itself.7 ' The proceeds of the renewals need not be
applied toward the retirement of the notes or bonds originally issued
upon acquisition of the property. When the proceeds are not so
applied, however, disclosure must be made to those who lend for
investment purposes, unless the provisions of the Mortgage Broker-
age Act cover the transaction. 78
7. SALES TO INSTITUTIONS
The exemption for sales to institutional investors rested on the
theory that sophisticated investors can compel the required infor-
mation from an issuer."' The exemption in the Sale of Securities
Law extended to all banks, savings institutions, trust companies,
insurance corporations, pension plans and broker-dealers.28 , The
inclusion of all corporations among the select group of institutional
investors was criticized by commentators as archaic. 22 Even sales
of securities to a "Ma and Pa" candy store, if incorporated, were
exempted. The potential for abuse of this exemption was staggering.
The institutional exemption of the Florida Securities Act in
section 517.061(7) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) does not
extend to corporations. Regulated investment companies, however,
remain within the exemptioh. The statute also contracts the scope
of the former exemption by excepting sales to pension or profit-
sharing plans with assets of less than $500,000. An intent clause was
added to the statute to prevent abuses which might arise if potential
purchasers were to organize sham institutions for the purpose of
evading the registration provisions.
277. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(9) (Supp. 1978).
278. Rule 3E-5.03(1), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,643.
279. Rule 3E-5.03, 1 BLUE SKY L. RP. (CCH) 13,643.
280. In fact, such institutions usually want information which is different than the items
which are provided in a prospectus. See Casey, supra note 23, at 576.
281. FLA. STAT. § 517.06(5) (1977) (repealed 1978).
282. Royalty & Jones, The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue Sky
Laws-Shoals in the Safe Harbor, 33 WASH. & LE_ L. REv. 877, 895 (1976).
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IV. PROFESSIONALS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
The Reporter to the Law Revision Council advocated partial or
total elimination of blue sky regulation of broker-dealers, salesmen
and investment advisers since the federal laws and industry self-
regulation provided ample protection."' This recommendation was
not adopted. As a result, the policies which underlay the other por-
tions of the Florida Securities Act conflict with the apparent prolif-
eration of regulation in this area. Some of the changes will increase
the operating costs of professionals: increases which will be passed
on to the investor.
A. Who are the Professionals?
The scope of regulation can be broadened or narrowed by
changing the definition of the class of persons subject to the sub-
stantive regulatory controls. The definitional section of the Florida
Securities Act, which contains the definitions of the professionals,
was taken almost verbatim from the draft of the Reporter to the Law
Revision Council. This aspect of the regulation of professionals is,
therefore, more in keeping with the regulatory philosophy of other
portions of the Florida Securities Act.
1. DEALERS
The definition of "dealer" and, therefore, of "broker," remains
much the same under the Florida Securities Act as under the Sale
of Securities Law.2" As under prior law a broker-dealer is one who
engages, for at least part of his time, in the business of trading in
securities as an agent or principal.2 Issuer-dealers are included
within this definition.281 Under the Sale of Securities Law issuers of
283. Mofsky, supra note 6, at 32-33.
284. According to FLA. STAT. § 517.021(4) (Supp. 1978), a broker is a dealer as defined
in § 517.021(6). The Florida blue sky law does not distinguish between brokers and dealers
as does the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) & (5) (1976). To avoid
difficulties in the discussion of both the federal and blue sky definitions, the term "broker-
dealers" will be used to indicate Florida "dealers."
285. REPORT, supra note 122, at 2-3.
286. Id. The concept of issuer-dealers is not new to Florida law. It was present in the
earliest blue sky law, 1913 Fla. Laws ch. 6422, § 6, and was later incorporated into the Sale
of Securities Law by the Florida Legislature four years after it adopted the uniform act. 1935
Fla. Laws ch. 17253, § 6. The concept of an issuer-dealer exists to a lesser extent under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Pursuant to the federal law, the concepts of issuer and dealer
are mutually exclusive when the issuer is engaged in the sale of its own securities. See
Augustine & Fass, Broker-Dealer Licensing in the Field of Real Estate Syndication, 29 Bus.
LAw. 369, 370 (1974). The relevant question under the federal standard is whether the persons
selling the securities of the issuer have the type of relationship with the issuer which will bring
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exempt securities were not considered dealers, but no such limita-
tion is placed upon the definition of dealer in section 517.021(6) of
the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). Some limitations on the defini-
tion do exist by virtue of sections 517.12(2) and (3) of the Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1978). The only significant change here is the re-
moval of options traders from the class of regulated persons. Thus,
if the activities of a professional in Florida consist exclusively of
writing, selling or purchasing options as an agent or principal, he
will not be considered a broker-dealer.
2. INVESTMENT ADVISERS
Under the Sale of Securities Law all of those persons within the
definition of "investment advisers" were deemed "dealers. '28 7 The
terms are given separate definitions in the Florida Securities Act,
the distinction being based upon their different functions and exper-
tise.2 New section 517.021(8) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978)
provides that any person who makes a business of advising others
about the value of or desirability of buying and selling securities is,
subject to certain exceptions, an investment adviser. Several classes
of persons have been specifically exempted from regulation as in-
vestment advisers because there is no need for additional regulation
as to them. First, licensed attorneys or certified public accountants
are not investment advisers if their services are offered in the regular
practice of their profession. Second, an exemption applies to persons
who advise less than fifteen clients in twelve consecutive months.2 11
Third, banks or trust companies are not regulated as investment
advisers if they render their services in a fiduciary capacity in ac-
cordance with their trust powers. Fourth, investment advisers who
service only insurance and investment companies are exempted.
Fifth, dealers will not be treated as investment advisers if they
them within the federal issuer-dealer exemption. Id. at 370-74. Thus, proposed rule 3a4-1(2),
2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 21,152, appears to test whether the issuer's agent is an ordi-
nary employee or a hired securities professional. For a comparative analysis of the issuer-
dealer concept in federal and Florida law, see Leisner, Perils and Pitfalls for Unregistered
Securities Brokers, 51 FLA. B.J. 683 (1977).
287. FLA. STAT. § 517.02(4)(d) (1977) (repealed 1978).
288. "The most important distinction is the clarification between 'dealer' and
'investment adviser'. A 'dealer' is actively engaged in selling securities while an 'investment
adviser' provides advice concerning securities and is not involved in the actual sale of securi-
ties." REPORT, supra note 122, at 2.
289. This exemption parallels that of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3(b)(3) (1976). A significant difference between the two exemptions is that the federal
exemption is inapplicable if advice were rendered to a registered investment company.
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render the advice only incidentally to their performance as dealers
and without additional compensation.
3. SALESMEN
New section 517.021(13) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978)
does not alter the definition of "salesman." Salesmen are persons
who are employed, appointed, or authorized by a dealer or an issuer
to sell securities in any manner, or who act as investment advisers.
The partners of a partnership and the executive officers of a corpora-
tion or other association regulated as a dealer are not salesmen
within the meaning of this definition.
B. Registration of Professionals
The general rule of section 517.12 of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1978) is that no professional may engage in his business until he is
registered to perform the function of investment adviser, salesman
or dealer. The procedures and conditions of this registration have
been altered dramatically. This panoply of new controls acts to
create new barriers to entry into the securities industry.
In general, the disclosure requirements of the application im-
posed by the statute are much more detailed than those which had
previously existed. Commentators, however, do not anticipate a
change in practice because many of the specifications were drawn
from rules of the Department of Banking and Finance which existed
prior to the amendment of section 517.12.290 Among the technical
changes is a new provision for waiver of the Florida Securities Law
Examination and the Florida Securities General Knowledge Exami-
nation on condition that the applicant pass the tests administered
pursuant to section 15(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.11
The major change in the registration process is the inclusion of
a net capital rule. Section 517.12(8) of the Florida Statutes (Supp,
1978) provides for the establishment of rule 3E-6.031, 9 1 which sets
the standard for the rule. The rule parallels the SEC's net capital
rule but does not contain many of its ameliorative or alternative
methods of computation. The latter rule, which is extremely com-
plex, provides that a broker-dealer who clears through another
290. See Louv, Broker-Dealer, Salesman and Investment Advisor Regulation, in THE
FLORIDA SEcuRmEs Acr, supra note 47 at 6.5.
291. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1976).
292. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,654.
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broker-dealer must have minimum net capital of $5,000. These
broker-dealers who conduct a general securities business are re-
quired to have a minimum net capital of $25,000. Broker-dealers
who act as market makers are required to have minimum net capital
of between $25,000 and $100,000 depending upon the number of
securities in which they make markets and the price of the securities
involved. In addition, established broker-dealers are required to
maintain a ratio of fifteen to one in aggregate indebtedness to net
capital, and young firms must have a ratio of eight to one. The rule
also provides that if the broker-dealer is a member of NASD, or any
national securities exchange, the net capital computation will be
made in accordance with the rules of that organization."9 3
Unfortunately, promotional firms seeking equity capital must
ordinarily rely upon the services of underwriters who are not yet
established and are, therefore, adversely affected by the net capital
rule."' Because funds will be unavailable to the more speculative
enterprises, such as Edison, Inc.,2 15 innovation and the creation of
new products will be discouraged. The public will also be harmed
by the net capital rule when brokers are forced to charge more for a
decreased quality of service.
Some relief from the net capital rule is afforded to issuer-
dealers. There is no requirement for the maintenance of a ratio of
aggregate indebtedness to net capital. Issuer-dealers selling securi-
ties in an amount less than $250,000 must maintain an excess of
$5,000 of total assets over total liabilities, the assets being valued
at cost.n' If the offering is to raise more than $250,000, the issuer
must maintain a net capital of $25,000. This rule, in effect, imposes
293. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1978).
294. See Mofsky, SEC Financial Requirements for Broker-Dealers: Economic Implica-
tions of Proposed Revisions, 47 IND. L.J. 232, 237-38 (1972).
295. See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra. The loss of such firms as Edison, Inc.
and the products they would produce is a significant factor to be considered when the impact
of the regulation upon the public is concerned:
The small business attempting to raise public capital necessarily relies on the
investment banking services of small securities firms, since large New York Stock
Exchange members do not generally underwrite securities offerings by speculative
companies of firms lacking a strong earnings history. In the long run, the most
significant loss to society occasioned by a reduction in the number of small securi-
ties firms may not be the loss of the small securities firms themselves. Indeed,
the more significant loss may well be all the small businesses that could only be
capitalized with funds raised through the efforts of the small securities firm.
Mofsky, supra note 294, at 238 (footnotes omitted). Whether the net capital rule could survive
an attack based upon the cost/benefit criteria of FtA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (Supp. 1978) is
unclear,
296. Rule 3E-4.02(3)(a)(4), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,632.
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a merit standard upon promotional firms because the promoters will
be required to fund the firm with either $5,000 or $25,000 depending
upon the size of the offering.
C. Exemptions
Under the Sale of Securities Law persons who acted as profes-
sionals with respect to exempt transactions were not regulated as
professionals. Dealers in exempt securities were regulated unless
they engaged solely in exempt transactions. Thus, bond dealers who
sold only to institutions, or investment advisers who advised only
investment companies, were not required to register under the Sale
of Securities Law. Issuer-dealers were exempted from registration
when they sold securities solely through exempt transactions. 97
Under the Florida Securities Act, an exemption is provided for
issuer-dealers of all exempt securities other than those issued by
religious or charitable institutions. Issuer-dealers also continue to be
exempt from regulation if they issue their securities in certain ex-
empt transactions. The general exemption for professionals with
respect to exempt transactions does not extend to options traders,
dealers selling securities at or near the market price or professionals
involved in sales pursuant to a registration statement which has
become effective under the Securities Act of 1933.
D. Revocation, Denial or Suspension of Registration
Section 517.161 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) provides
the grounds for and the procedure through which a professional will
lose the right to practice. Violation of the Florida Securities Act or
any lawful rule thereunder will constitute adequate grounds to halt
the activities of a professional.29 Similarly, a violation of the rights
of his clients will be grounds for the Department of Banking and
Finance to prohibit a professional from operating."' The scope of
some of the other grounds is less clear.
Section 517.16(1)(k) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) states
that the Department may prohibit a professional from operating if
the professional is of "bad business repute." This term is not de-
fined in the Florida Securities Act. The Florida Legislature may
have delegated too much authority to the Department when it failed
to limit the scope of this grant of power.10  A similar problem exists
297. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.12(1), (8) (1977) (repealed 1978).
298. Id. §§ 517.161(1)(a)-(d), (g) & (0) (Supp. 1978).
299. Id. §§ 517.161(o), (e) & (f).
300. For a discussion of the constitutional proscription against delegation of legislative
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With respect to the provision which allows action where a profes-
sional "has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business
of dealer, investment adviser, or salesman.""' Although the Depart-
ment has promulgated a rule to help determine what shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence of unworthiness, the remaining uncer-
tainty inherent in the vague statutory language may leave the latter
subject to constitutional attack on due process grounds. 02
An additional problem with section 517.061 involves the proce-
dure for revocation of a registration under subsection (3). The stat-
ute provides that the Department upon its own determination may
enter a final order revoking a license. There is no statutory require-
ment that the professional be given prior notice or an opportunity
to be heard. Subsection (3) appears to be derived from identical
language in subsection (6) of repealed section 517.16 of the Florida
Statutes (1977). Under the repealed statute, subsection (6) followed
other subsections which specifically provided for prior notice and
hearing. The term "determination" in subsection (6) meant a deter-
mination based upon a hearing which included the full panoply of
procedural protections. The new statute contains no such supple-
mental language. Section 517.161 should be amended to specify the
applicable procedure.
E. Security Guarantee Fund
A new and significant provision of the Florida Securities Act
concerns the establishment of a Security Guarantee Fund and the
elimination of the bonding requirement for broker-dealers which
had existed under the Sale of Securities Law. The cost of member-
ship in the fund is small when compared to the premium for a
$50,000 bond, which had been required under the prior law. The
fund is created by assessing each registered broker-dealer or invest-
ment adviser twenty-five dollars per year, plus five dollars per sales-
man and twenty-five dollars for each branch office. These assess-
ments continue until the fund exceeds $250,000 at the end of a
license year. From that time forward no additional fees are imposed
unless the fund is reduced below $150,000.1°
In order to recover from the Security Guarantee Fund, a person
authority to an administrative body, see text accompanying notes 261-66 supra. When the
grant of power does not include clear standards for the exercise of authority, but can be fairly
interpreted in a manner which provides the agency with complete discretion, the statute may
be held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1977).
301. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(h) (Supp. 1978).
302. Rule 3E-6.10, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,661.
303. FLA. STAT. § 517.131(1) (Supp. 1978).
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must have suffered monetary damages as a result of acts committed
by a registered professional and a court determines that the damage
resulted from a violation of the securities registration provisions
and/or the antifraud provisions. To obtain a payment, the person
seeking damages must establish that the judgment debtor lacks
sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. No recovery from the fund
may be based upon a wrongful act occurring prior to January 1,
1979.
Section 517.141 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) provides
that claimants may apply to the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance for payment from the Security Guarantee Fund for the
amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of the judgment or $10,000,
whichever is less, but only to the extent of actual or compensatory
damages. No more than $100,000 is to be paid out of the fund with
respect to the wrongs of a particular professional regardless of the
number of persons injured by the professional. In cases of multiple
claims, the $100,000 will be pro rated among the number of claim-
ants.
Under prior law, victims of broker-dealers had recourse against
a bond worth $50,000. Under the Florida Securities Act, such per-
sons may only obtain damages of $10,000 where the professional has
no assets. The reform seems to have placed investors in a worsened
position. In order for the fund to provide an adequate remedy each
claimant should be able to receive a maximum of $50,000, subject
to the $100,000 limitation in cases of multiple claims. Amendment
of this statute, therefore, is suggested.
V. ENFORCEMENT
The Florida Securities Act places an increased emphasis upon
the enforcement of the antifraud provisions. Because it is generally
not possible to prevent securities fraud through the proliferation of
costly filing and registration requirements, it is absolutely essential
to identify and arrest fraudulent activities if the citizens of the State
of Florida are to benefit from the existence of the blue sky laws.
Thus, the antifraud provisions and the enforcement powers con-
ferred upon the Department of Banking and Finance are the crux
of the Florida Securities Act.
A. Antifraud
Section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes (1977) establishes a rule
of antifraud liability for deception through misstatements, omis-
sions or practices which operate as frauds. That provision contains
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further prohibitions against the knowing and willful use of falsified
documents and the concealment of material facts through coverups
or similar means."' The only amendment to this statute was the
rewording of the introductory language from "[i]n the sale or pur-
chase" 301 to "[in connection with the offer, sale or purchase.""3 '
This revision was occasioned by the separate definition of the terms
"offer" and "sale" in the Florida Securities Act. 07 Under the Sale
of Securities Law the term "sale" comprehended both offers and
sales.308 Thus, the scope of activities which will give rise to liability
under section 517.301 are precisely the same as under the prior law.
A separate variety of frauds is identified in section 517.311 of
the Florida Statutes (1977). This section prohibits representations
that an agency or officer of the federal government or the State of
Florida has sanctioned the security or the professional unless: the
statements are required by the Florida Securities Act or by the rules
of the Department of Banking and Finance; the statement is true
in fact and does not have the effect of a misrepresentation.3 0 Practi-
tioners have discovered certain problems with respect to the breadth
of this section. For example, if the Metropolitan Dade County In-
dustrial Revenue Authority should issue bonds stating that the Met-
ropolitan Dade County Industrial Revenue Council has approved of
the issuance of the bonds, that declaration may be prohibited by
section 517.311 despite the truth of the statement because neither
the Florida Securities Act nor any rule of the Department requires
that the statement be made. For this reason the section should be
amended to permit representations that a governmental agency or
official has sanctioned the security.
B. Injunctions
The principal antifraud enforcement method is the power con-
ferred by section 517.191 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) to
allow the Department of Banking and Finance to bring injunctive
actions against certain violations of the Florida Securities Act. Al-
though the language of sections 517.191(1) and (2) was simplified by
the recent amendment, the broad grant of injunctive power to the
Department still allows it to enjoin all violations of the Florida
Securities Act.
304. Id. § 517.301(1) (1977).
305. Id. § 517.301.
306. Id. (Supp. 1978).
307. Id. § 517.021.
308. Id. § 517.02 (1977).
309. Id. § 517.311(1), (3).
[Vol. 33:1223
SECURITIES ACT OF 1978
Although the Florida courts have not examined the criteria for
granting injunctions for some time, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit has recently addressed that issue. In SEC
v. Blatt,"' the law firm of Blatt & Udell represented a company, a
majority of whose stock had been acquired by another corporation.
After Blatt learned through inside information of, the intention of
the parent company to acquire additional shares of the subsidiary
he caused a long-time client, Pullman, to acquire the requisite num-
ber of shares without disclosing this inside information to the six-
teen sellers of the shares: Pullman made a huge profit on the resale
after holding the stock for a few months. Sometime thereafter, the
parent company announced its intention to merge with the subsidi-
ary. Blatt and Udell then placed the subsidiary stock which they
owned into the hands of a trustee to conceal their ownership. The
law firm, which had continued to represent the subsidiary, did not
counsel the rejection of the plan of merger nor did Blatt disclose any
unsatisfactory aspects of the exchange offer. Nonetheless, he or-
dered his trustee to seek dissenters' appraisal rights. Blatt and Udell
were held liable under SEC rule 10b-5 for nondisclosure to the sur-
viving corporation, and Blatt and Pullman were held liable under
rule 10b-5 for nondisclosure of material facts to the sixteen share-
holders who had sold them the subsidiary's stock.
The trial court granted injunctions against Blatt, Udell and
Pullman. In reviewing the propriety of the injunctions, the Fifth
Circuit articulated the following standard:
The trial court should consider several factors in deciding
whether to issue an injunction in light of past violations. The
critical question in issuing the injunction and also the ultimate
test on review is whether defendant's past conduct indicates that
there is a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.
To obtain injunctive relief the Commission must offer positive
proof of the likelihood that the wrongdoing will recur. The Com-
mission needs to go beyond the mere fact of past violations."
Thus, the government must establish that there is a likelihood of
recurring violations. Applying this test, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
injunctions against Blatt and Pullman but vacated the injunction
against Udell. Because Blatt had been the "mastermind" of at least
two frauds in the past, there was reason to believe he would commit
securities frauds in the future. An injunction against Pullman was
considered proper because he had engaged in a serious fraud and
310. 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
311. Id. at 1334 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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because he would continue to engage in many investment opportun-
ities. Udell's involvement had been minor and he had committed
only one infraction; nothing suggested that Udell would participate
in frauds in the future.
Although the Florida courts are not bound by the standard
adopted by the, Fifth Circuit, the test appears to be rooted in the
considerations underlying the injunction remedy. Because these
considerations are common both to the power of the SEC and to the
power of the Department as established in section 517.191, the Flor-
ida courts may ultimately adopt the rule of Blatt.
A second unresolved issue in Florida law concerning injunctions
is whether the Department must establish scienter in past violations
in order to obtain injunctions against future violations. One Florida
court has spoken on the issue of whether scienter is a necessary
element of a private antifraud action. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Byrne,"' the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that scienter was not an element of the plaintiff's case
based on the court's analysis of then existent federal precedent:
"We think the better Federal decisions and the clear weight of au-
thority is that scienter is not necessary to recovery."3'
After Byrne was decided, the Supreme Court of the United
States handed down its decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 31 ,
holding that scienter is a necessary element of the plaintiff's case
in a private action under the federal antifraud provisions. This re-
sult was based upon the language of the provisions banning decep-
tions, manipulations and acts which otherwise defraud."5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently
held that the rule of Ernst & Ernst will govern the determination
of whether the SEC should be granted an injunction which it is
seeking. " Thus, a demonstration of intentional misconduct is a
prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. This requirement is in
harmony with the reasoning that injunctions should not be granted
unless there is a reasonable likelihood of future wrongdoing. Only
when the defendant has intentionally committed past frauds is
312. 320 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
313. Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
314. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
315. "When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and
of implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly understood terminology of inten-
tional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." Id. at 214.
316. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
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there reason to believe that he will continue to work frauds in the
future."17
Currently it is unclear whether the Florida courts will adhere
to Ernst & Ernst and Blatt. Certainly, they are not bound to do So.31
Blatt, however, appears to be a well-reasoned construction of anti-
fraud provisions which are similar to those of the Florida Securities
Act.3 18 Byrne was decided as it was specifically because the existing
federal cases were inconclusive, although the weight of the federal
authority favored the result.
C. Receiverships
Section 517.191(2) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) confers
authority upon the Department of Banking and Finance to apply for
and to obtain receiverships. Experience with the acceleration of
destructive effects upon an entity that accompanies certain full
receiverships has led the SEC to seek the appointment of some or
all directors by a court.19 In cases where the immediate liquidation
of the entity is not expected, Florida courts should consider a flexi-
ble approach to the receivership remedy.
D. Disgorgement
Under the Sale of Securities Law the Department of Banking
and Finance was not authorized to seek disgorgement or other forms
of restitution. In Wee Mac Corp. v. State ex rel. Dickenson,12 the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, stated: "Nothing in the
Statute authorizes the State to seek recovery on behalf of private
purchasers. The wisdom of this decision of the legislature is evident
since the private purchasers are not parties to this suit and therefore
have not been heard upon the business decision involved." '' Thus,
the court refused to apply the remedy of restitution because the
shareholders may have approved the business decision, although it
subsequently proved to be incorrect.
Under amended section 517.191 of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1978), the Department is given permissive authority "to apply to the
317. Ernst & Ernst itself expressly left open the question of the extension of its rule to
SEC enforcement actions. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The circuits are in conflict. Compare SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) with SEC v. World Radio Mission,
Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
318. See REPORT, supra note 122, at 1.
319. See Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29
Bus. LAW. 121, 123-24 (1974).
320. 301 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
321. Id. at 102.
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court hearing [the] matter for an order of restitution, 322 if it estab-
lishes that money was obtained through a violation of the Florida
Securities Act. The courts, at their discretion, may refuse to grant
a disgorgement request by the Department. Furthermore, defenses
to the request may exist for the person against whom disgorgement
is sought. Since the proceeding is essentially in the form of a parens
patriae action, defenses against the Department include those de-
fenses which would 'have existed against the persons on whose behalf
restitution is sought. Thus, the fact that the shareholder has ap-
proved of or consented to the acts of the defendant would be a
defense to the Department's claims. Therefore, the rationale of Wee
Mac will continue to occupy a place of some importance in disgorge-
ment actions.
Additional limitations should be placed upon the application of
this rather drastic remedy. Commentators have criticized the mush-
rooming use of disgorgement by the SEC and have argued that
courts should not impose restitution as a penalty. 23 Recently, the
courts have responded by establishing more restrictive tests. Thus,
the Fifth Circuit recently held:
The purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of
fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain ...
Disgorgement is remedial and not punitive. The court's power to
order disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by
which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing. Any further
sum would constitute a penalty assessment.32'
E. Cease and Desist Orders
The power to issue cease and desist orders is conferred upon the
Department of Banking and Finance by new section 517.221 of the
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). Such an order may be issued if the
Department has reason to believe the recipient of the order has
violated or is about to violate the Florida Securities Act or the rules
thereunder. The procedure for the order is governed by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 25 Accordingly, the Department must serve
notice of the order and hearing (essentially an order to show cause)
upon the person charged with the violation. The cease and desist
order does not become final until the recommendation after the
322. FLA. STAT. § 517.19(d) (Supp. 1978).
323. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought By the SEC, 1977
DUKE L. J. 641.
324. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978).
325. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1977).
1294 [Vol. 33:1223
SECURITIES ACT OF 1978
hearing and the issuance of a final order. The fine of $1,000 can only
be imposed after the final cease and desist order is in effect.32
F. Criminal Prosecutions
Pursuant to section 517.302 of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1978), any violation of chapter 517 is a felony in -the third degree.
Because criminal actions must be brought by the state's attorney,
the Department refers all criminal matters to the state's attorney
for prosecution.2 7 A five-year statute of limitations is provided by
section 517.302.
Section 517.07 of the Florida Statutes (1977) requires the party
seeking the benefit of an exemption from registration to establish
the existence of its right to that exemption. In State v. Buchman2
the Supreme Court of Florida held that this rule applied to criminal
prosecutions involving the sale of unregistered securities. There, the
prosecutor was excused from proving that an exemption did not
exist because the legislative intent did not indicate that the lack of
an exemption was an element of the offense.2 1
A standard for proving scienter in criminal actions was estab-
lished in State v. Houghtaling.3 0 In Houghtaling, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that scienter was not an element necessary to
a violation of the provisions for registration of securities or profes-
sionals. Whether scienter is required in a prosecution for antifraud
violations remains an open question under Florida law.3 '
VI. ADDENDUM
Prior to the publication of this article, the Florida legislature
326. Aggrieved recipients of final orders may petition for the appropriate district court
of appeal for review of the final order. In all cases in which the Department's order has the
effect of suspending or revoking a license, enforcement will be stayed or supersedeas will be
granted as a matter of right. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(3) (1977).
327. In Yarbrough v. Pfeiffer, 1979 FLA. L. WEEKLY 359, (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 14) (No. 78-
1559), a securities broker was charged with the sale of unregistered securities. In its investiga-
tion, the Department of Banking and Finance was assisted by the Department of Criminal
Law Enforcement, which obtained and executed a search warrant for business records. The
court refused to grant immunity to the broker under the self-incrimination rule provided by
FIA. STAT. § 914.04 (1975) because the broker had not been personally compelled to produce
the records. Thus, the Department can utilize the powers of other government agencies even
in administrative proceedings and thereby extend its own reach to those powers provided
under the criminal statutes.
328. 361 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1978).
329. Id. at 695.
330. 181 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1966).
331. See Snyderburn, Enforcement Under Chapter 517, in THE FLORIDA SECURrrIES Acr,
supra note 47, at 7.10.
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amended the Florida Securities Act in several respects. Further-
more, the Florida Division of Securities promulgated emergency
regulations, effective September 1, 1979, which significantly change
practice under the Florida Securities Act. Although these revisions
will be discussed in the next survey of the Florida blue sky law,
several of the changes should be mentioned in connection with this
article.
The Florida private placement exemption has been changed
significantly. First, according to an emergency rule of the Division
of Securities, effective September 1, 1979, issuers may not pay com-
missions or compensation to an offeree representative unless the
offeree representative is registered as a dealer under the Florida
Securities Act. Second, there is no longer an exemption from the
disclosure requirements for offerings involving less than five pur-
chasers. Third, the two-tiered disclosure system provided in the
rules has been abolished. Fourth, specific conditions for the satisfac-
tion of "access" have been established. Fifth, the three-day rescis-
sion option has been modified: purchasers may rescind their sale
three days after the first tender of consideration to the issuer or its
escrow agent or three days after this right is communicated by the
issuer to the purchasers, whichever is later.
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